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Fria Tider

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Fria Tider
TypeDaily newspaper
FormatOnline newspaper
Editor-in-chiefWidar Nord
Founded2009; 15 years ago (2009)
LanguageSwedish
HeadquartersTallinn
CountrySweden
Websitefriatider.se

Fria Tider (Free Times) is a Swedish-language right-wing populist news site.[1] Oxford University's Internet Institute's Project on Computational Propaganda identified "Fria Tider" as one of the three primary "junk news" sources in Sweden.[2][3] Analysis by Swedish Defence University lists Fria Tider as having the highest proportion of disinformation among Swedish sources.[4]

Fria Tider actively promotes Kremlin narratives[5] and content by Sputnik,[6][7][8] a Russian propaganda outlet.[18] Fria Tider is known to promote views in favor or Russian invasion of Crimea and Russian war against Ukraine. Granskning Sverige, a network connected to Fria Tider is on European Union's list of disinformation sources.[19]

Research by Swedish Defence Research Agency concluded that news by Fria Tider are much more frequently shared by Twitter bots, compared to news from other sources.[20] An analysis of 12 million online links made by The New York Times concluded that a lot of Fria Tider's traffic is generated by non-Swedish sites.[21]

References

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  1. ^ "A Case Study on Swedish AlternativeMedia" (PDF). Swedish Defence Research Agency. 2024-04-20. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2024-04-20. Retrieved 2024-07-09. Fria tider is a right wing populist news site
  2. ^ Jack Stubbs, Johan Ahlander (2018-09-06). "Exclusive: Right-wing sites swamp Sweden with 'junk news' in tight election race". Reuters. Archived from the original on 2024-06-30. Retrieved 2024-06-30. The top three "junk news" sources identified by the study - right-wing websites Samhallsnytt, Nyheter Idag and Fria Tider - accounted for more than 85 percent of the "junk news" content.
  3. ^ "Mapping the 2018 Swedish General Election on Twitter" (PDF). University of Oxford. 2023-10-08. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2024-06-30. Retrieved 2024-06-30. The most frequently shared junk news sites — Samhällsnytt, Nyheteridag, and Fria Tider — accounted for 86% of all junk news shares.
  4. ^ "Identifying and Understanding Anti-Immigration Disinformation: A case study of the 2018 Swedish national elections" (PDF). DiVA (open archive), Swedish Defence University. 2024-04-07. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2024-06-16. Retrieved 2024-06-30.
  5. ^ "Smearing Sweden: International Influence Campaigns in the 2018 Swedish Election" (PDF). London School of Economics. 2023-03-10. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2024-02-07. Retrieved 2024-06-30. Some of the online news magazines most popular with the far-right, such as Nya Dagbaldet and Fria Tider, promote narratives that are in line with the Kremlin agenda
  6. ^ Becker, Jo (2019-08-10). "The Global Machine Behind the Rise of Far-Right Nationalism". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2019-08-10. Retrieved 2024-07-09. Fria Tider is considered not only one of the most extreme sites, but also among the most Kremlin-friendly. It frequently swaps material with the Russian propaganda outlet Sputnik.
  7. ^ Martin Kragh; Sebastian Åsberg (2024-04-30). "Russia's strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case" (PDF). Journal of Strategic Studies. Routledge. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2024-06-30. Retrieved 2024-06-30. The web-based platform Fria Tider, with organisational ties to the identitarian movement, actively promoted Swedish Sputnik content in 2015.
  8. ^ "Banden stärks mellan svenska högerextremister och Putins maskineri (Från 2017)". Svenska Yle (in Swedish). 2017-06-19. Archived from the original on 2023-11-10. Retrieved 2024-07-18. Av Kraghs och Åsbergs undersökta period kommer det fram att Fria Tider ofta spred vidare det innehåll som Sputnik News producerade på svenska, och vice versa.(transl. During the period examined by Kragh and Åsberg, Fria Tider often distributed content produced by Sputnik News, and vice versa.)
  9. ^ Benkler, Yochai; Faris, Rob; Roberts, Hal (October 2018). "Epistemic Crisis". Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation and Radicalization in American Politics. Oxford University Press. p. 358. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190923624.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-092362-4. OCLC 1045162158. Archived from the original on 26 January 2021. Retrieved 21 March 2021. The emphasis on disorientation appears in the literature on modern Russian propaganda, both in inward-focused applications and in its international propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT (formerly, Russia Today). Here, the purpose is not to convince the audience of any particular truth but instead to make it impossible for people in the society subject to the propagandist's intervention to tell truth from non-truth.
  10. ^ Karlsen, Geir Hågen (5 August 2016). "Tools of Russian Influence: Information and Propaganda". In Matláry, Janne Haaland; Heier, Tormod (eds.). Ukraine and Beyond. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 199. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9_9. ISBN 978-3-319-32530-9. Archived from the original on 7 April 2023. Retrieved 28 February 2022 – via Google Books. The propaganda apparatus proper consists of four means: media, social media, political communication and diplomacy, and covert active measures, all tied together in a coordinated manner. The main international media channel is the RT broadcaster and website, formerly known as Russia Today. It is complemented by Sputnik radio and website, news and video agencies, and the Russia Beyond the Headlines news supplement, making up a news conglomerate operating in almost 40 languages.
  11. ^ Ižak, Štefan (January 2019). "(Ab)using the topic of migration by pro-Kremlin propaganda: Case study of Slovakia" (PDF). Journal of Comparative Politics. 12 (1). University of Economics in Bratislava / University of Ljubljana / Alma Mater Europaea: 58. ISSN 1338-1385. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022. Almost all important media in Russia are state controlled and used to feed Russian audience with Kremlin propaganda. For international propaganda Kremlin uses agencies like RT and Sputnik. Both are available in many language variations and in many countries (Hansen 2017). Aim of this propaganda is to exploit weak spots and controversial topics (in our case migration to the EU) and use them to harm integrity of the West (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014).
  12. ^ Golovchenko, Yevgeniy (11 December 2020). "Measuring the scope of pro-Kremlin disinformation on Twitter". Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. 7 (1). Springer Nature: 1–11. doi:10.1057/s41599-020-00659-9. ISSN 2662-9992. When it comes to overt reach, the Russian government openly funds English-speaking outlets, such as Sputnik News and RT. These outlets serve as a frequent source of pro-Kremlin disinformation both according to scholars, fact-checkers and Western authorities (BBC, 2019; Elliot, 2019; Thornton, 2015).
  13. ^ Fletcher, Richard; Cornia, Alessio; Graves, Lucas; Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis (1 January 2018). "Measuring the reach of "fake news" and online disinformation in Europe" (PDF). Australasian Policing. 10 (2). Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022 – via Mediterraneo Cronaca. For comparative purposes, we also included two prominent Russian news sites which have featured in European policy discussions around disinformation, namely Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik. These Russian state-backed organisations are clearly different from sites that engage in for-profit fabrication of false news, but both independent fact-checkers and the EU's European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force have identified multiple instances where these sites have published disinformation.
  14. ^ Groll, Elias (10 November 2014). "Kremlin's 'Sputnik' Newswire Is the BuzzFeed of Propaganda". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 26 February 2020.
  15. ^ Nimmo, Ben (January 2016). "Sputnik. Propaganda in a New Orbit: Information Warfare Initiative Paper No. 2". Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Archived from the original on 6 March 2019. Retrieved 14 December 2019.
  16. ^ "Report: Russia spread fake news and disinformation in Sweden". Sveriges Radio. Radio Sweden. 9 January 2017. Archived from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 16 August 2022.
  17. ^ "RT a Sputniku nebyla povolena účast na konferenci o svobodě médií" [RT and Sputnik were not allowed to attend the conference on media freedom]. Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats (in Czech). Archived from the original on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 2022-02-28.
  18. ^ [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17]
  19. ^ "Det finns med på EU:s lista över rysk desinformation". SVT Nyheter (in Swedish). 2017-03-14. Archived from the original on 2024-06-30. Retrieved 2024-06-30. Nätverket är kopplat till den högerextrema sajten Fria Tider, och bådas sajter lyfer fram debattörer som tar ställning för Ryssland efter ockupationen av Krim och det ryskstödda inbördeskriget i Ukraina, enligt Eskilstuna-Kurirens granskning.
  20. ^ "Botar och det svenska valet". FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency. 2024-04-05. Archived from the original on 2024-06-30. Retrieved 2024-06-30. I vår analys av vilka domäner kontona oftast länkar till observerar vi att botar länkar mer till Samhällsnytt och Fria Tider än vad genuina konton gör.
  21. ^ Delkic, Melina (2019-08-12). "Russian Explosion, Jeffrey Epstein, Uighurs: Your Monday Briefing". nytimes.com. Archived from the original on 2022-11-27. Retrieved 2024-07-18. By the numbers: The Times analyzed more than 12 million available links from over 18,000 domains to four prominent far-right sites — Nyheter Idag, Samhallsnytt, Fria Tider and Nya Tider. While most of the links came from Swedish-language sites, the analysis turned up a surprising number of links from well-trafficked foreign-language sites — which suggests that the Swedish sites' rapid growth has been driven to a significant degree from abroad.
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Official site (in Swedish)