Lieutenant General (retired) David Furness’ Post

The General is spot on! The Corps is selling itlself short and will compromise for even less if it can get anything at all. The result will be that the Corps will fall flat and fail to step up when most needed. We have already seen this with NEAO's having to be conducted by other services because the Marines did not have the required sea lift when needed. Given the condition of the few remaining ships still operable, we need a 40 ship 3.0 ARG/MEU to project the global presence our mission statement requires as "America's force in readiness when America is least ready" as identified and designated by Congress. The Marine Corps is and has been America's first "rapid reaction force." But the Corps has been neglecting its amphibious capabilities to its own detrement while responding to other contingencies and operational needs. The bill now to replace, rebuild and expand our amphibious cabilities to address the needs of the U.S. in our present and future chaotic world will be steep but necessary to ensure America can continue to be depended on "America's 911".

Some good points, but over hyperbolic and way off the mark. This commentary demonstrates a lack of a basic understanding of what the US Navy does. Mr. Cooper states that the Navy is "...run and ruled over by two former Aegis Captains." This is not surprising and it is how it should be... anyother situation would be alarming. US Naval doctrine is based off of a Mahanian tradition, which prioritizes controlling SLOCs with a Bluewater fleet --- and our Aegis DDGs are what gets that job done. (former SSN Captains would also meet the requirement). The mission in the Red Sea is a case in point: LCS, PCs, MCMs, fuel barges, cannot do that job. The USAF is run by fighter pilots for the same reason: They apply airpower in its kinetic form as a primary mission, and thats what the Airforce does. We do need small ships; however, they are supporting assets and not the focus of the service. The Navy and ADM Franchetti, in particular, are trying to fix our nations' shipbuilding mess - a mess that Mr Cooper likely understands very well, as he lists his employment for Austal as a member of the LCS fiasco on his C.V. I am sure that the CNO knows where these auxiliary vessels fit into the plan, but she is focused on building warships and submarines that can deter and defeat the PLAN, the Russian Fleets, and Iran and NK at sea in a real fight. This is exactly where the focus should be now.... it should have always been here, but we were distracted by the post-cold war environment that spawned projects like LCS. As a note: The Army Corps of Engeneers is going to run the salvage of the FSK bridge wreckage, also the Army has floating cranes and utility tugs at Fort Eustis with the JLOTS mission that are heading to Gaza... they have these assets because non-combat littoral construction work and operations in friendly ports is not in the US Navy's remit... it's the Army's job. The Navy, via the USMC and SeeBees, can land on a hostile shore, secure it, and build a port and/or airfield, but once that's done the Army is supposed to conduct normal port operations (security and logistics movements). They have a Battalion dedicated to that mission... they used to have more, and maybe that's where the investment needs to be made? Forbes and Mr Cooper can do much better in analyzing naval matters. https://lnkd.in/d4zKFAyZ

I don’t often go off the deep end but I feel the need to vent. The below article set me off and it is just one indicator of the US Navy’s design and operational capabilty support problems. As I sit somewhat isolated in my retired world, I can’t help but wonder how did we (the U.S. Navy) dig our holes so deep? I started to get glimpses of rot when I worked on gathering data for the LCS MCM Nunn-McCurdy breach debacle back in 2010. The LCS MCM development, design, and procurement decisions, in hind sight, were short sighted and ill advised. Looking backwards we realize that none of the LCS decisions, starting with two hull designs, seemed like a good idea. Now we are decommissioning LCS craft way before their original design life. We are paying the price for poor decisions that were made by leadership that is long gone and can’t be held accountable. Add on “bean counting” decisions to close navy shipyards that have now resulted in extensive maintenance back logs, particularly in the submarine world, the cost savings never surfaced. There are numerous other problems. The Osprey hasn’t lived up to its hype and now carrier resupply is being impacted. Carrier onboard aerial refueling capabilities have been gapped for years. What were we thinking? Something is broke and we can’t see the ocean due to the massive amount of salt water between the continents. I am just whining and have no solutions but I hope somewhere we can get the Navy on a little bit better footing. https://lnkd.in/ecnS9hmC

But given the recent #Baltimore Key Bridge incident, that is pretty apparent. Yet, one more redundant system in commercial shipping could have the chance to prevent these kinds of mishaps. If not full-scale military redundancy, then again, adding emphasis to further necessary means. I think from a different standpoint, it's just as important to look at the issue. The United States is at a critical moment—a critical crossroads—when it comes to the absolute urgency of modernizing our port #infrastructure. The collapse of the Baltimore Bridge is grim news, yes, but one more wake-up call that spells out both how fragile our national supply chains are and how likely the long-term exposure of that #vulnerability is. The state of U.S. port infrastructure is a critical issue that demands our immediate attention. It's not just about immediate disruptions; it's about the long-term economic impact and our competitive edge in maritime #logistics. With many facilities over 50 years old, the need for #modernization is not just about accommodating larger ships, but about securing the future of our maritime logistics and #supply chain. The Port Infrastructure Development Program (PIDP) has made strides, with over $653 million invested in port improvement projects across the nation. Yet, to fully address the unmet waterside infrastructure needs, projected at $12.3 billion over the next decade, and to enhance the #efficiency of goods movement, we must continue to advocate for substantial and sustained investments. The economic implications are profound, affecting not only immediate logistical disruptions but also the broader resilience of the national supply chain. It's our responsibility to stay informed and support initiatives that aim to modernize our ports. Let's engage with policymakers, industry leaders, and the community to ensure that the necessary funding and resources are allocated to secure a competitive and efficient future for U.S. #maritime logistics. Together, we can turn the tide towards a more resilient and prosperous infrastructure. #Infrastructure #Modernization #SupplyChain #MaritimeLogistics #InvestInPorts #MaritimeLogistics #PortModernization #SupplyChainResilience #PIDP #GlobalTrade #USNavy #CommercialShipping #TransportationSafety #InnovationInTrade

#Baltimore #bridge #collapse shows the #vulnerability of #supplychains. One bridge collapse has shut down the entire harbor’s logistics and transportation capabilities. IMHO, the author’s argument linking it with sabotage, cyberattack, or hijacking is way too far. However, I agree that the single propeller and single rudder on the container ship are critical factor for the collapse. I don’t know how many backup systems a commercial ship has. For a naval ship, she has at least two propellers and five backup rudder systems to ensure the survivability. I don’t except that commercial ship will adopt many redundant systems as naval ships. However, she should have at least two redundant systems not to repeat a similar accident in the future. https://lnkd.in/g8GKgdmk

Having retired from Naval service after a decade, I may not be the most qualified to critique, but I feel compelled to share my observations following today's announcement. It's encouraging to witness the unveiling of a strategic plan for the Royal Australian Navy. However, the details on how the Australian government intends to actualise the proposed recommendations remain notably absent. 1. The Manpower Maze At the core of the expansion's feasibility issues is a critical challenge: manpower. The blueprint for an enlarged and more lethal fleet demands a corresponding increase in skilled personnel to crew and maintain the new ships. This requirement places the Navy at the cusp of a personnel crisis, grappling with the dual hurdles of recruitment and retention in an already stretched thin defence manpower pool. The sophisticated nature of the proposed vessels further complicates this issue, necessitating extensive, specialized training for sailors and technicians—a process that cannot be rushed without compromising operational readiness and effectiveness. 2. The Timeline Trap Complicating the manpower concern is the ambitious timeline for the delivery of new warships. Naval shipbuilding is a notoriously complex and time-consuming process, often beset by delays stemming from technological challenges, supply chain issues, and the unpredictable currents of political and economic change. These delays not only jeopardise strategic readiness but also exacerbate the manpower dilemma, creating a catch-22 where both ships and sailors may not be ready when needed most. 3. The Supplier Shuffle Adding another layer of complexity to the Navy's expansion is Australia's approach to diversifying its defense suppliers, engaging with countries like the USA, Germany, Japan, France, and Spain. This strategy, while broadening Australia's technological and strategic horizons, introduces significant challenges in terms of training, parts, and equipment continuity. The resultant scenario is one where sailors and officers are stretched thin, cross-trained across a patchwork of systems from different countries, diluting their expertise and complicating maintenance and operational readiness. This diversity in suppliers also complicates the Navy's supply chain, introducing a logistical labyrinth of differing regulations, production schedules, and potential bottlenecks. The attempt to weave together a coherent supply strategy from this global tapestry of defense contractors is a daunting task, fraught with the risk of delays, increased costs, and maintenance headaches.

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I'm a bit confused regarding what role this ship actually fulfills and how it's supposed to do it consistently. Collectively can they provide any lethal direct / indirect support to forces once ashore? Are they their own primary shore connectors? Will groups of them be expected to have to fight their way bewteen islands - or to at least help in a fight between islands? Or are they only expected to defend themselves as they cut gator-squares behind a screen then land the landing forces piece-meal / administratively in a permissive (or permissive-like) environment? Stepping stone to the future and birth of a new ability / capability or an expensive flotilla of pseudo Super LCACs without the bags and blades? What say you?

Nicholas V., reading this brings to mind a quote from the classic movie, The Outlaw Josey Wales, "Don't piss down my back and tell me it's raining." Some solid Information Operations going on here, though. I recall General Gray, God bless him, expressing similar sentiments during his time at the helm. I suppose this MOU might be good for "optics", as it relates to our image in Congress, and that's important. It's been a while, but it appears that we cannot currently maintain a bonafide 2-MEU presence...one from the left and right coasts simultaneously. It helps to be able to get the ships out of port, I reckon. MEU/MEB/Forcible Entry from the Sea? Is that a thing anymore? Precision/hypersonic anti-ship weapons (never mind the current abysmal state of our amphibious shipping, as a whole) would suggest perhaps not, but then again, we're talking about buying billions of dollars worth of small, lightly or unarmed "littoral" ships, complete with the absence of LST-esque bow ramps or flat bottoms for beach access, to insert Marines and our own anti-ship missiles onto small islands in the South China Sea. I've got a great book for anyone interested..."Guadalcanal: Starvation Island". Or just google the word "starvation".

A fire main system aboard any US Navy vessel distributes pressurized seawater for firefighting, auxiliary equipment cooling, dewatering, and wash down services. The fire main is one of the most mission critical fluid distribution system aboard any Naval vessel. It follows then, that the isolation valves in such a critical system would be designed to enable the crew’s ability to quickly isolate portions of the fire main after battle damage. Emerson’s TOTS (triple offset torque seated) valve (Vanessa) does this very well. The Vanessa valve has the double offset features of The Navy’s standard High- Performance Butterfly Valve (MIL-V-24624), but a third offset was created. Offset 3 is where the seat and seal cone centerlines are inclined in respect to the pipe/valve centerline. This third offset eliminates rubbing completely, yet still results in zero leakage. These features support a longer life expectancy, reduced maintenance requirements, and a lower cost of ownership compared to traditional gate, butterfly, and other valve designs. In general, the Vanessa valve will usually fit perfectly into the space vacated by an older-style butterfly valve. Contact that JA Moody technical sales team for more information and pricing. #Shipbuilding #MarineIndustry #Valves #Actuators