Constanze Stelzenmüller

7/2/24 National Security News and Commentary https://conta.cc/4cJin5c 1. Israeli Generals, Low on Munitions, Want a Truce in Gaza 2. NATO to Establish Kyiv Post, and Seeks to ‘Trump-Proof’ Ukraine Aid 3. Satellite Images Show Expansion of Suspected Chinese Spy Bases in Cuba 4. The World Is Realigning: An emerging Axis of Resistance confronts the Liberal Alliance. 5. NDU At Fort Liberty/JFK Special Warfare Center and School: Master of Arts in Strategic Studies 6. The weaponization of security clearances 7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1, 2024 8. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, July 1, 2024 9. Eight Antifa Defendants Sentenced in Pacific Beach Assault Case 10. ‘In the Shadows’ Review: The Hostage Bargainer 11.Solving the Problem of Postwar Gaza 12. China builds new presidential palace in Pacific's Vanuatu 13. A.I. Begins Ushering In an Age of Killer Robots 14. Lawsuit accuses Iran, Syria and North Korea of providing support for Hamas' Oct. 7 attack on Israel 15. Wokeness Is Awful. Nationalism Is Far Worse. 16. ‘Real Portal to Hell’ – Ukrainian Paratroopers Repel Assault, Destroy Seven Russian Fighting Vehicles With Troops 17. The Digital Battlefield: How Social Media is Reshaping Modern Insurgencies 18. The Looming Crisis in the Taiwan Strait 19. America Is Still Not Ready for the Next Outbreak 20. The Illogic of Doubling Down on a Failed Approach: Security Assistance and Terrorism in Africa

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Dear all, in a newly published Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report together with Samuel Bendett, Max Bergmann, Tina Dolbaia and Nick Fenton we have looked into the Russian military industry's adaptation to the sanctions in the second year of war. Main takeaways: 1) The report argues that in 2023 Russia has successfully adapted its military and defense industry to minimize the impacts of the Western sanctions regime. The Kremlin has ramped up domestic production of weapons and equipment and thus has kept its army relatively well supplied. Russia still relies on its older refurbished weapons stockpiles, and goods that come from its new suppliers are of lower quality than their Western alternatives. But the current war of attrition often does not require sophisticated high-end weapons systems and instead may be fought with large amounts of relatively cheap munitions. Russia has thus moved away from tailored high-end military components toward dual-use or even purely civilian technologies. As a consequence, the composition of Russia’s suppliers has also changed as more military goods flowing into Russia are sourced from civilian or dual-use suppliers. These efforts to reinvigorate its defense industry, coupled with the current pace of the war and the ongoing Western stagnation of Ukraine aid, have ultimately translated into direct Russian battlefield successes. 2) The report also identifies the imported components and weapons categories that Russia’s defense industry has particularly relied on in the second year of the war. These include tanks (mostly refurbishing those already in stock), artillery systems, UAVs (including the rapid emergence and scaling up of the so-called Russian loitering munitions kill chain), missiles, and EWs. 3) Whether producing new systems from scratch (such as drones) or refurbishing older systems (such as tanks), Russia actively relies on imported dual use components it gets from firms based in (primarily) China as well as other jurisdictions. Our team also leveraged unique global supply chain data to track Russia’s general procurement dynamics and the efforts of Russian companies affiliated with the Kremlin’s war machine. 4) Existing Russian military industrial limitations include: reconstitution rate (Russia is severely depleting its reserve stockpiles to sustain its war effort), ammunition shortages (Moscow is likely not producing enough ammunition to replenish what it is using); signs of overheating economy such as inflationary pressures and labor shortages; stretched arms exports; failing import substitution in critical areas; overreliance on China and corruption in the military. 5) The report concludes by assessing how Russia’s performance throughout 2023 and its evolving defense capabilities might translate into its offensive posture in Ukraine in 2024. Please read, comment and share!

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Serious doubts about the results of such exercise. Serious doubts about the willingness to learn from such "adventure" at all. I was there in november 200I and remember very well those diners at UNICA seating at the table with Lakhdar Brahimi and listening to these #US envoys, special advisers, congressmen, etc. People full of themselves, full of arrogance, of desir of revenge, blind, with a slight superiority complexe, incapable of listening what we had to say about history, culture, religion, the origin of the #Taliban mouvement, about being careful and not to underestimate #Afghans, etc. there was zero interest in listening, learning from people who had been working, living there, who had learnt a few things, sometimes the hard way. zero interest then. And now, 22 years later "they" wake up and want to learn? Give me a break! 🤣 Another one - I remember also all this nonsense #PRT concept. Many studies questionned the approach and were doubtfull about chances of success of such approach. Billions USD spent, wasted, with very little accountability. I remember attending conferences, including in Washington, on Capitol hill, and questionning the US approach, with evidences. And again facing the same total absence of self-criticism, zero appetite to listen and learn from.others. etc. This sudden urge to learn 22 years later to do better is not convincing. US wants to learn? Let me help save some precious tax payer money. Here is the lesson learnt - free of charge: "stay away from others' country and stop thinking your way is the only way, your model is the best - it is not. Colonisation was a disaster yesterday and still is today".

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#US wants to learn about why it failed in #Afghanistan... Serious doubts about the results of such exercise. Serious doubts about the willingness to learn from such "adventure" at all. I was there in november 200I and remember very well those diners at UNICA seating at the table with UNSRSG Lakhdar Brahimi and listening to these #US envoys, special advisers, congressmen, etc. People full of themselves, full of arrogance, of desir of revenge, blind, with a slight superiority complexe, incapable of listening what some decent advisers had to say about history, culture, religion, the origin of the #Taliban mouvement, about being careful and not to underestimate #Afghans, etc. there was zero interest in listening, learning from people who had been working, living there, who had learnt a few things, sometimes the hard way. zero interest then. And now, 22 years later "they" wake up and want to learn? Give me a break! 🤣 Another one - I remember also all this nonsense #PRT concept. Many studies questionned the approach and were doubtfull about chances of success of such approach. Billions USD spent, wasted, with very little accountability. I remember attending conferences, including in Washington, on Capitol hill, and questionning the US approach, with evidences. And again facing the same total absence of self-criticism, zero appetite to listen and learn from.others. etc. This sudden urge to learn 22 years later to do better is not convincing. US wants to learn? Let me help save some precious tax payer money. Here is the lesson learnt - free of charge: "stay away from others' country and stop thinking your way is the only way, your model is the best - it is not. Colonisation was a disaster yesterday and still is today".

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As expected, no major breakthroughs in NATO's 2024 Washington Summit Declaration, other than proclaimed decisions to make some procedural adjustments to improve coordination among the allies on the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine, as well as streamline NATO's coordination with the EU to avoid duplication of effort. But the nature of Ukraine-NATO relationship is not expected to change much, i.e. no further clarity on how the allies plan to help Ukraine win and what specific conditions must be met for NATO to agree to take the alliance's relationship with Ukraine to the next level, toward eventual membership. https://lnkd.in/djCnX9Rv

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Interesting short piece on ongoing evolutions in tank warfare, examining tactical & technological adaptation in recent conflicts from Nagorno Karabakh to Israel & Ukraine

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In my latest column, I discuss the intensifying conflict in the Middle East and suggest that Iran's support for HAMAS and its recent missile attack on Israel are part of its campaign to derail the peace negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. https://lnkd.in/ePaCBNYH

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Ukraine is now using recently supplied longer-range ATACMS and sophisticated drones to degrade Russian air defenses in Crimea, hit air-bases from which Russian interceptors fly and strike critical logistics and economic targets. “The focus on crippling Russia’s air-defense network may also be part of the preparation for the imminent arrival of the first batches of F-16 fighter jets…” https://lnkd.in/dNq8Freh

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The latest Shangai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana was the occasion for President Putin to widespread his usual propaganda against the West and to blame it for the war in Ukraine. Ironically, he proposed to set up a regional new forum for security where each state would sit on a equal basis. He should know that this forum already exists with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). #russia #osce #sco

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Russia's War Against Ukraine: Connectivity and Disruption in the South Caucasus. The Caucasus Analytical Digest, No. 132 Author(s): Stefan Meister, Laurence Broers, Katja Kalkschmied, Vali Kaleji Connectivity and disruption are key elements in analysing the impact of the Russian large-​scale war against Ukraine on the South Caucasus. Laurence Broers analyses the simplified, securitised and conservative thinking about connectivity in the South Caucasus. For Katja Kalkschmied, China’s interest in the Trans-​Caspian International Transport Route has increased. Vali Kaleji argues that the security balance in the South Caucasus has shifted away from Iran. With a focus on Armenia and Azerbaijan, Stefan Meister argues that there is an ongoing reshuffle of the regional security balance and geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus.

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Though published nearly one month ago, this piece captures many of the risks and challenges in Georgia's current political climate. The points hold today, and will remain relevant from now through the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Worth the read. https://lnkd.in/ddmNT_G4

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Check out our new project- The Ties That Bind: NATO at 75 and Beyond. We're examining how the alliance has shaped the transatlantic relationship and what challenges lie ahead. Read more on Substack. https://lnkd.in/gTyHHQSR

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With presidential elections looming in both Iran and the U.S., a shift toward increased pressure, signaled by an IAEA censure, could have serious repercussions. This move might lead to Iran’s case being referred to the U.N. Security Council or prompt the E3 states to “snap back” U.N. sanctions on Iran. Such developments would be highly counterproductive, dramatically escalating tensions and reducing the chances for diplomatic resolution. https://lnkd.in/e9BYGy7m

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As we move into day two of the #NATOSummit, key discussions will center on addressing the strategic challenges posed by China and rallying robust support for Ukraine. For an overview, I’ve summarized the expectations and critical points for Atlantic Council. Read the full insights here:

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