Language rights of Hungarian minority in Ukraine at the heart of Kyiv-Budapest spat

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Analysis Based on factual reporting, although it Incorporates the expertise of the author/producer and may offer interpretations and conclusions.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long accused Ukraine's government of infringing upon the rights of ethnic Hungarians residing in the Ukrainian region of Transcarpathia to speak their native language in education and public administration. [EPA-EFE/Zoltan Mathe]

As the European Union launches accession negotiations with Ukraine, Hungary’s presidency of the EU Council from 1 July  to 31 December risks stalling the process, with minority rights being the key point of contention.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long accused Ukraine’s government of infringing upon the rights of ethnic Hungarians residing in the Ukrainian region of Transcarpathia to speak their native language in education and public administration.

‘Big space for manoeuvring’

According to the 2001 census, Hungarians made up 12% of the entire South Western region (approximately 150,000 people), although many have emigrated since the start of Russia’s invasion.

Orbán’s government has blocked crucial EU funding for Ukraine and threatened to impede the country’s efforts towards joining the bloc, bringing diplomatic ties to worrying lows.

The dispute is rooted in Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen its national identity after Russia-backed forces partially took control the eastern Donbass region in 2014 and Moscow annexed Crimea. 

In 2017, Kyiv passed a law to bolster the national language, making the study of Ukrainian mandatory after the fifth grade. Though it mainly targeted Russian, languages spoken by other minorities like Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and Greeks were inevitably affected.

A later amendment specified that 100% of education can be in a minority language of the EU from the first to fourth grade. From the fifth class, at least 20% of study time should be in Ukrainian, progressively reaching 40% in ninth grade and 60% in twelfth.

“On the one hand, it’s a challenge to implement the law; nobody monitors what language is spoken. On the other hand, it’s a big space for manoeuvre margin for schools and teachers,” Dmytro Tuzhansky, an expert on Ukrainian-Hungarian relations, told Euractiv.

The 2017 law was amended several times to satisfy the minorities, with the transition period extended from three to five years up to 2022. After the full-scale Russian invasion into Ukraine, the transition period was extended for one more year. Additionally, private schools are not included.

In December, just before the end of the transition period, Kyiv amended the text to comply with the EU accession requirement, the Venice Commission’s recommendation, and Hungary’s political demands.

According to newly adopted legislation, four subjects are mandatory in Ukrainian: the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian literature, Ukrainian history, and civic classes called “Defence Ukraine.”

“So in reality, the 2017 education law was never really implemented,” said the Institute of Central European Strategy director based in Transcarpathia’s regional capital, Uzhhorod.

A letter to Orbán

In the meantime, the Hungarian minority developed a network of private schools in Transcarpathia, where pupils only study in Hungarian.

“Hungarians can study in Hungarian in Transcarpathia without any problem, fully or partially. All the debate is at a high level between Kyiv and Budapest. It seems like nobody is asking the minority,” Tuzhansky said.

In December, several leaders of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine urged Orbán not to block Ukraine’s accession to the EU, stressing “significant progress in implementing the European Commission’s recommendations on ensuring the rights of national minorities”.

“The new draft law adopted by the Ukrainian parliament significantly reflects the interests of national minorities and enjoys our full support,” said the letter sent to European Council President Charles Michel and Viktor Orbán.

“At the same time, we hope that all the provisions adopted in this comprehensive law will be implemented (…) considering all the proposals submitted by the NGOs of Transcarpathian Hungarians.”

Despite these claims, in January 2024, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó asked “for the return to its national minority of the rights it enjoyed until 2015” after talks in Uzhhorod with his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba.

In March 2024, Hungary sent to Kyiv and to EU member states a list of eleven new demands, setting out its claims regarding its minority in Ukraine.

The document – not made public – included the creation of a special status for Hungarian schools, the possibility of using Hungarian in official documents and communication with the state, and the appointment of a Hungarian delegate to the Ukrainian Parliament to ensure political representation. 

Dual citizenship

“We don’t want anything more than what we have in the European Union,” Laslov Zubanych, head of the Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine (UMDSZ), one of the two Hungarian parties operating in Ukraine and signatory of the letter, told Deutsche Welle Ukraine.  

“If Ukraine wants to return people from abroad who, including during the full-scale war, received citizenship of other states, it must resolve this issue,” Zubanych added.

Another source of resentment is the fact that even if they hold a Hungarian passport, draftable men from 18 to 60 years old cannot leave the country. 

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy submitted a draft law in January to allow multiple citizenships and comply with EU’s practices. However the rules on the mobilisation of Ukrainian citizens who hold a foreign passport would not change.

Although Ukraine does not recognize dual citizenship, Budapest has long given passports to the Hungarian minority, courting their votes. The government and several funds connected to Orbán invested billions in the poor region by supporting cultural and social activities, often closely intertwined with politics.

[Edited by Alexandra Brzozowski/Zoran Radosavljevic]

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