Timeline for Why would a state retaliate to a nuclear strike if the consequences could be human extinction?
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17 events
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| Jan 24 at 17:06 | history | edited | Tim | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jan 24 at 10:25 | comment | added | Baard Kopperud | Just an apropos from "Yes, Prime Minister" - the most relevant bit is after about 50 seconds: youtube.com/watch?v=XyJh3qKjSMk | |
| Jan 23 at 19:43 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jan 23 at 15:05 | comment | added | Idran | This is a very minor point, but honeybee attacks aren't suicidal per se, because most of the time stinging is fairly safe for them. Stinging mammals is fatal because our skin is thicker and the barbs get stuck, yeah. But against the far more common threats they encounter that are more on their scale, like wasps or spiders, their stingers don't get stuck. The barbs just make the stings more damaging when the bee pulls the stinger out. | |
| Jan 23 at 1:16 | comment | added | Alexander The 1st | Or perhaps put another way - the retaliatory action is an action with limited timing in the same way "Speak now or forever hold your peace." is also a limited time action - it's just the nuclear variant of it. | |
| Jan 23 at 1:12 | comment | added | Alexander The 1st | I'd also add that the attacker would reasonably bet that if there were a retaliation by the attacked nation, it would be an immediate response - attempting to hold a grudge over a "Previously small nuclear exchange" ignores that the nuclear attacks likely reduced the retaliatory stockpile. As a result of that, if an attacked nation is going to retaliate at all, it has to be before the first attack finishes, and with all weaponry that would be diminished otherwise towards a retaliatory nature. | |
| Jan 23 at 0:50 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jan 22 at 22:40 | comment | added | barbecue | While technically it may not be an actual extinction of the entire human race, the death of billions of people would certainly result in the extinction of many races and cultures. The fact that a few people survive does not really make it that much less horrific. | |
| Jan 22 at 20:54 | comment | added | paulj | Honey Badgers approve this answer. | |
| Jan 22 at 20:44 | comment | added | Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine | @NickS: MAD doesn’t deny that after an attack, the rational move might be to not retaliate. It argues that to deter an attack beforehand, you must convince other actors that attacks will receive retaliation — and exactly because the retaliation will be (at the later stage) arguably irrational, you construct a system in advance that commits you to the later retaliation (maybe electronically/mechanically, a Dr Strangelove-style doomsday machine, but at least socially/culturally, as in most real-world militaries). The rational action now is (it argues) to commit to irrational action later. | |
| Jan 22 at 14:36 | comment | added | JBentley | This answer appears to merely support the question's premise ("it is thus in the interest of all parties involved to give the appearance (publicly) that they would retaliate"), but doesn't answer the question ("it is not clear why actually adhering to this retaliation policy in the event of a nuclear strike is in the interest of the targeted party"). Once the initial strike happens, the "if there is any doubt" argument is no longer relevant, so why does the target retaliate? | |
| Jan 22 at 1:04 | comment | added | Nick S | I'm sure the logic in the first statement is a big part of the real answer, but in a purely game theory context, it makes the same mistake as Roko's basilisk. Once the other country has already launched, nothing you do will make them less likely to have made that decision in the past. Causality doesn't work in that direction. | |
| Jan 22 at 0:43 | comment | added | Allure | Because if there is any doubt that the targeted country will retaliate, then the aggressor may very well try their luck This is the answer people really want to believe, but it's not accurage. "Any doubt" would mean that if the chances of retaliation are anything less than 100%, the aggressor might as well try their luck. | |
| Jan 21 at 23:44 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jan 21 at 19:58 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jan 21 at 17:29 | history | edited | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jan 21 at 16:08 | history | answered | Italian Philosophers 4 Monica | CC BY-SA 4.0 |