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Look to o.m.'s answer for a complement, so I don't need to repeat it.

I will add some extra considerations however:

First, all militaries are extremely slow to evolve, doubly so when it comes to their branches, which typically see intense rivalry to preserve prestige and funding. The US is not exception. Even if what you said was correct, one could expect the Marines to tick on for a looong time.

Second, "Marines" makes it sound like we are talking about a proper noun. They are not, really, they are a common noun. The notion of shipboard infantry spans millennia. In French for example, we have "fusiliers marins", marine riflemen. Many countries will have similar forces. True, most countries don't have a whole Corps of them, but then again most countries have to worry about nearby land threats so land-only infantry is key. The US does not.

Third, airborne as a solution sounds neat. Except for the airborne armor bit. As the poor sad Russian VDV has found out in Ukraine, you can have light IFVs. Or well-armored IFVs. Not both.

. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.

Don't let 50 years of mostly counter insurgency US warfare fool you: fighting a peer opponent requires a different, heavier, mix of tools than keeping the peace in a poor country.

Fourth, to some extent the Corps is aware of the issue. Combined with the pivot to the Pacific theory and the US desire to contain China, the Corps is currently conjuring up a new doctrine - Force Design 2030 (subject to considerable internal disputes within the Corps):

• drop heavy tanks
• switch to lighter forces armed with drones and long range land-to-ship missiles
• prepare to disseminate smaller, stealthier, Marine groups throughout the First Island Chain and ambush Chinese Navy ships from land, using those long range missiles.

wikipedia

Basically, pull a bunch of Moskvas on the Chinese Navy.

I don't know how well that would work out in practice. It sounds gimmicky, but does have the theoretical potential to be an awesome asymmetric, David-vs-Goliath approach.

I do know this is not a mission that would be suitable for standard US Army troops, since it has a much more naval component to it. Both in the operating environment, and in the specialized heavy weapon mix that is required.

Look to o.m.'s answer for a complement, so I don't need to repeat it.

I will add some extra considerations however:

First, all militaries are extremely slow to evolve, doubly so when it comes to their branches, which typically see intense rivalry to preserve prestige and funding. The US is not exception. Even if what you said was correct, one could expect the Marines to tick on for a looong time.

Second, "Marines" makes it sound like we are talking about a proper noun. They are not, really, they are a common noun. The notion of shipboard infantry spans millennia. In French for example, we have "fusiliers marins", marine riflemen. Many countries will have similar forces. True, most countries don't have a whole Corps of them, but then again most countries have nearby continental neighbors to worry about. So their ground forces aren't, primarily, organized around distant force projection. The US's ground forces are likely to be operating way outside of US territory however. And the US is spendthrift, defense-wise.

Third, airborne as a solution sounds neat. Except for the airborne armor bit. As the poor sad Russian VDV has found out in Ukraine, you can have light IFVs. Or well-armored IFVs. Not both.

. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.

Don't let 50 years of mostly counter insurgency US warfare fool you: fighting a peer opponent requires a different, heavier, mix of tools than keeping the peace in a poor country.

Fourth, to some extent the Corps is aware of the issue. Combined with the pivot to the Pacific theory and the US desire to contain China, the Corps is currently conjuring up a new doctrine - Force Design 2030 (subject to considerable internal disputes within the Corps):

• drop heavy tanks
• switch to lighter forces armed with drones and long range land-to-ship missiles
• prepare to disseminate smaller, stealthier, Marine groups throughout the First Island Chain and ambush Chinese Navy ships from land, using those long range missiles.

wikipedia

Basically, pull a bunch of Moskvas on the Chinese Navy.

I don't know how well that would work out in practice. It sounds gimmicky, but does have the theoretical potential to be an awesome asymmetric, David-vs-Goliath approach.

I do know this is not a mission that would be suitable for standard US Army troops, since it has a much more naval component to it. Both in the operating environment, and in the specialized heavy weapon mix that is required.

Look to o.m.'s answer for a complement, so I don't need to repeat it.

I will add some extra considerations however:

First, all militaries are extremely slow to evolve, doubly so when it comes to their branches, which typically see intense rivalry to preserve prestige and funding. The US is not exception. Even if what you said was correct, one could expect the Marines to tick on for a looong time.

Second, "Marines" makes it sound like we are talking about a proper noun. They are not, really, they are a common noun. The notion of shipboard infantry spans millennia. In French for example, we have "fusiliers marins", marine riflemen. Many countries will have similar forces. True, most countries don't have a whole Corps of them, but then again most countries have to worry about nearby land threats so land-only infantry is key. The US does not.

Third, airborne as a solution sounds neat. Except for the airborne armor bit. As the poor sad Russian VDV has found out in Ukraine, you can have light IFVs. Or well-armored IFVs. Not both.

. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.

Don't let 50 years of mostly counter insurgency US warfare fool you: fighting a peer opponent requires a different, heavier, mix of tools than keeping the peace in a poor country.

Fourth, to some extent the Corps is aware of the issue. Combined with the pivot to the Pacific theory and the US desire to contain China, the Corps is currently conjuring up a new doctrine - Force Design 2030 (subject to considerable internal disputes within the Corps):

• drop heavy tanks
• switch to lighter forces armed with drones and long range land-to-ship missiles
• prepare to disseminate smaller, stealthier, Marine groups throughout the First Island Chain and ambush Chinese Navy ships from land, using those long range missiles.

wikipedia

Basically, pull a bunch of Moskvas on the Chinese Navy.

I don't know how well that would work out in practice. It does have the theoretical potential to be an awesome asymmetric, David-vs-Goliath approach.

I do know this is not a mission that would be suitable for standard US Army troops, since it has a much more naval component to it. Both in the operating environment, and in the specialized heavy weapon mix that is required.

Look to o.m.'s answer for a complement, so I don't need to repeat it.

I will add some extra considerations however:

First, all militaries are extremely slow to evolve, doubly so when it comes to their branches, which typically see intense rivalry to preserve prestige and funding. The US is not exception. Even if what you said was correct, one could expect the Marines to tick on for a looong time.

Second, "Marines" makes it sound like we are talking about a proper noun. They are not, really, they are a common noun. The notion of shipboard infantry spans millennia. In French for example, we have "fusiliers marins", marine riflemen. Many countries will have similar forces. True, most countries don't have a whole Corps of them, but then again most countries have to worry about nearby land threats so land-only infantry is key. The US does not.

Third, airborne as a solution sounds neat. Except for the airborne armor bit. As the poor sad Russian VDV has found out in Ukraine, you can have light IFVs. Or well-armored IFVs. Not both.

. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.

Don't let 50 years of mostly counter insurgency US warfare fool you: fighting a peer opponent requires a different, heavier, mix of tools than keeping the peace in a poor country.

Fourth, to some extent the Corps is aware of the issue. Combined with the pivot to the Pacific theory and the US desire to contain China, the Corps is currently conjuring up a new doctrine - Force Design 2030 (subject to considerable internal disputes within the Corps):

• drop heavy tanks
• switch to lighter forces armed with drones and long range land-to-ship missiles
• prepare to disseminate smaller, stealthier, Marine groups throughout the First Island Chain and ambush Chinese Navy ships from land, using those long range missiles.

wikipedia

Basically, pull a bunch of Moskvas on the Chinese Navy.

I don't know how well that would work out in practice. It sounds gimmicky, but does have the theoretical potential to be an awesome asymmetric, David-vs-Goliath approach.

I do know this is not a mission that would be suitable for standard US Army troops, since it has a much more naval component to it. Both in the operating environment, and in the specialized heavy weapon mix that is required.

Look to o.m.'s answer for a complement, so I don't need to repeat it.

I will add some extra considerations however:

First, all militaries are extremely slow to evolve, doubly so when it comes to their branches, which typically see intense rivalry to preserve prestige and funding. The US is not exception. Even if what you said was correct, one could expect the Marines to tick on for a looong time.

Second, "Marines" makes it sound like we are talking about a proper noun. They are not, really, they are a common noun. The notion of shipboard infantry spans millennia. In French for example, we have "fusiliers marins", marine riflemen. Many countries will have similar forces. True, most countries don't have a whole Corps of them, but then again most countries have to worry about nearby land threats so land-only infantry is key. The US does not.

Third, airborne as a solution sounds neat. Except for the airborne armor bit. As the poor sad Russian VDV has found out in Ukraine, you can have light IFVs. Or well-armored IFVs. Not both.

. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.

Don't let 50 years of mostly counter insurgency US warfare fool you: fighting a peer opponent requires a different, heavier, mix of tools than keeping the peace in a poor country.

Fourth, to some extent the Corps is aware of the issue. Combined with the pivot to the Pacific theory and the US desire to contain China, the Corps is currently conjuring up a new doctrine - Force Design 2030 (subject to considerable internal disputes within the Corps):

• drop heavy tanks
• switch to lighter forces armed with drones and long range land-to-ship missiles
• prepare to disseminate smaller, stealthier, Marine groups throughout the First Island Chain and ambush Chinese Navy ships from land, using those long range missiles.

wikipedia

Basically, pull a bunch of Moskvas on the Chinese Navy.

I don't know how well that would work out in practice. It does have the potential to be an awesome asymmetric, David-vs-Goliath approach.

I do know this is not a mission that would be suitable for standard US Army troops, since it has a much more naval component to it.

Look to o.m.'s answer for a complement, so I don't need to repeat it.

I will add some extra considerations however:

First, all militaries are extremely slow to evolve, doubly so when it comes to their branches, which typically see intense rivalry to preserve prestige and funding. The US is not exception. Even if what you said was correct, one could expect the Marines to tick on for a looong time.

Second, "Marines" makes it sound like we are talking about a proper noun. They are not, really, they are a common noun. The notion of shipboard infantry spans millennia. In French for example, we have "fusiliers marins", marine riflemen. Many countries will have similar forces. True, most countries don't have a whole Corps of them, but then again most countries have to worry about nearby land threats so land-only infantry is key. The US does not.

Third, airborne as a solution sounds neat. Except for the airborne armor bit. As the poor sad Russian VDV has found out in Ukraine, you can have light IFVs. Or well-armored IFVs. Not both.

. For example, elite but relatively lightly equipped units (such as VDV, spetsnaz, and reconnaissance units) conducted operations they were not trained for or equipped to conduct, such as advancing into urban areas, where they appeared to suffer heavy casualties due to the lack of heavy armored support.

Don't let 50 years of mostly counter insurgency US warfare fool you: fighting a peer opponent requires a different, heavier, mix of tools than keeping the peace in a poor country.

Fourth, to some extent the Corps is aware of the issue. Combined with the pivot to the Pacific theory and the US desire to contain China, the Corps is currently conjuring up a new doctrine - Force Design 2030 (subject to considerable internal disputes within the Corps):

• drop heavy tanks
• switch to lighter forces armed with drones and long range land-to-ship missiles
• prepare to disseminate smaller, stealthier, Marine groups throughout the First Island Chain and ambush Chinese Navy ships from land, using those long range missiles.

wikipedia

Basically, pull a bunch of Moskvas on the Chinese Navy.

I don't know how well that would work out in practice. It does have the theoretical potential to be an awesome asymmetric, David-vs-Goliath approach.

I do know this is not a mission that would be suitable for standard US Army troops, since it has a much more naval component to it. Both in the operating environment, and in the specialized heavy weapon mix that is required.