Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.

Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians (trans. R.G. Bury)

夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於鷇音，亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？

Now, saying is not blowing breath. Saying has something to say. Only, what it says is never fixed. Have we then actually said something? Or have we perhaps never said something? If you consider it different from the twittering of baby birds, is there actually a distinction, or is there no distinction? How is the Way hidden that we have "genuine" and "false"? How does saying conceal so that we have "right/this (is an x)" and "wrong/(it) is not (an x)"?

Zhuang-zi (https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/adjustment-of-controversies 齊物論 4)