Skip to main content

All Questions

1 vote
0 answers
41 views

The knowability principle and the regress-theoretic epistemic types

The generic knowability principle is that if t is some truth, then it is possible for t to be known: t → ◊Kt. If foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism, and their combinations are taken as epistemic ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
0 votes
0 answers
65 views

Is category theory an example of foundherentism?

After reading this essay about the history of type theory, I have refined my assessment of the set- vs. type-theory question in two ways. More similarly to what I was thinking before, I still ground ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
148 views

Second-order skepticism

Let "kS" = "It is known that S." Then kkS or k2S is a common hypothesis in epistemic logic (the full hypothesis can be stated as kS → k2S). So a second-order skeptic [SOS] at least ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
208 views

A "paradox" of coherentism?

This is a follow-up to a question I had about foundationalism, which seems paradoxical inasmuch as it is a thesis that has been argued for (perhaps it is just the historical argumentation that is ...
Kristian Berry's user avatar