Given the number of similar related questions you've asked, it is clear this question is important to you, and it's perhaps not difficult to understand why, given that it relates to such a fundamental aspect of existence.
It is also easy to understand why you have not seemed to find any of the answers to date very satisfying. This is not a comment on the quality of responses to date - most of which (although I disagree on some fundamental points) betray considerable thought, effort and experience; more than I will be providing here - but on the nature of the problem with which you're engaging.
You have likely identified the fundamental issue at play here, and it's one you're unlikely to resolve:
All of the 'evidence for other minds' can be accounted for by the idea of solipsism.
In other words, if solipsism is true, it explains the experiences and phenomena to which we would usually turn to prove the counter-proposition that other minds exist.
I will draw from three of the previous answers to more fully explain my claim.
Philosodad's answer states:
Is there any evidence available to support the proposition that I am the only mind which exists? No.
Is there any evidence available to support the proposition that I am not the only mind which exists? Yes.
As Philosodad partially explains, if we analyse these claims, we quickly see that, if solipsism is true, any 'evidence' which ostensibly supports 'the proposition that I am not the only mind which exists' can be attributed to the solipsistic experience. Sensation, interaction, science, math, logic; all are theoretically producible by a single mental entity.
Whilst we typically turn to experience and observation for evidence - especially when there is a dearth of anything else - the very notion of solipsism calls into question the reliability of these ordinarily powerful evidentiary sources.
This is not a problem limited to the solipsistic debate, but to the debate about free will. For example, if determinism (whether diluted by randomness or not) is true, it calls into question the very 'observation' that we are in control of our decision-making. It calls into question the very experience to which we would ordinarily turn to for evidence; the experience which at root is the very means by which we perceive and process evidence.
User63220's reference to phenomenal conservatism certainly provides an indication that it is plausible to believe in the existence of other minds (which answers your question), but if you want to ground all of your beliefs (or merely this one) with evidence or proof, phenomenal conservatism will not help you.
Dcleve turns to Popper:
IF a theory is highly USEFUL in explaining observations and data
AND that theory makes predictions in areas where one did not already have data,
AND testing the theory led to confirmed risky predictions
THEN it is reasonable to assume the theory actually is true about the nature of our world
Dcleve points out that "The theory of other minds passes these criteria, with massive success.". But of course, solipsistic theory explains (if only in a very trivial sense) any experience of observation and data and predication to which Popper refers, so Popper doesn't really get you anywhere here if proof is what you're after. And, if all you're after is plausibility, it does nothing to diminish the plausibility of solipsism, for much the same reasons.
If plausible means something like, "Seeming reasonable or possible", then notions of what is plausible and what is not will likely vary widely. Only you can decide what seems plausible to you.
If plausibility for you requires something close to definitive proof, then you are unlikely to be satisfied by any of the arguments for or against other minds or solipsism, for we don't appear to have any means at present with which to delve any further into the question other than the very minds which are being called into question, which renders any resort to them rather unhelpful.