What ethical problems would recreating Neanderthals from preserved / extrapolated DNA raise?

Question

Watching this Debate on Extinctions, I was struck by the fact that the assembled panel seemed to have no clear consensus on the morality of recreating Neanderthals, even though most of them seemed to be in no doubt that this would be at least technically feasible within a matter of decades.

That video is the second half of a fairly long debate, so I'll just summarize a couple of points I think are now generally accepted by researchers, as background to the ethical issue...

1: Neanderthals had very limited language capabilities (they lacked the anatomy for versatile vocalization, the brain areas concerned with symbol processing are underdeveloped, etc.).

2: It looks like Homo Sapiens didn't just "outcompete" Neanderthals for resources - our ancestors systematically exterminated all other hominids they encountered. Which wasn't too difficult, since "we" could devise, communicate and refine plans for a better future, which other hominids couldn't.

I reason from the above "facts" that if we did recreate Neanderthals, our ability to communicate with them would forever be on a par with how we interact with, say, cats and dogs - they don't and never could have anything like human self-awareness, or a concept of "the meaning of [their] existence".

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I don't want to get bogged down in whether those "facts" are irrefutably established in the specific case of Neanderthals - if not them, there will surely be other even more primitive hominids we could eventually recreate, who would most definitely lack those mental capabilities we define today as "quintessentially human".

I'm also completely uninterested in the religious perspective here. I think religion and morality are at best orthogonal, and only "secular" morality can be expected to prevail in the long run.

Finally, I don't think the morality of recreating Neanderthals strongly correlates with the morality of creating self-aware Artificial Intelligence (which may or may not be technically possible), since in that case by definition our "unnatural creation" would be able to discuss their circumstances with us, as rational thinking entities. In essence, what I want to focus on is...

Exactly why might it be "immoral" to (re)create a relatively intelligent but not self-aware humanoid biped (complete with opposable thumbs, etc., and all that implies)?

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EDIT: To keep things tightly constrained, I want to address this issue in terms of Utilitarianism. I can easily find texts exploring the ethical treatment of existing animals from that perspective, but I'm specifically interested in the ethics of (re)creating a "non-self-aware, but intelligent" animal.

Answer 1

In your question, you are almost presupposing the answer when saying:

if not them, there will surely be other even more primitive hominids we could eventually recreate, who would most definitely lack those mental capabilities we define today as "quintessentially human" [.....] a relatively intelligent but not self-aware humanoid biped.

There are two assumptions you are making here:

• (A) That some hominids don't qualify as human.
• (B) You are adopting Rene Descartes' view that animals are automata that don't have conscious experience. See the IEP article on animals minds for Descartes arguments against animals having minds, as well the IEP article on animal ethics - Cartesian Theories.

From this point of view, recreating "sub-human" hominids is on par with cloning sheep or cloning frogs, and presumably there is nothing wrong with it, unless you object to cloning in general.

An opposing view was presented by Douglas Hofstadter, in his book "I am a strange loop", ("I am a strange loop", Chapter 1, "On souls and their sizes"). Hofstadter disagrees with your second assumption (B), and believes that most highly evolved animals, including all mammals have enough consciousness that they should be treated ethically. He doesn't see self-awareness as a on-off thing that a being has or doesn't have. Instead, he argues that there is a continuous scale of consciousness, with plants on end having none at all, insects having very little, and gradually increases until we get to full fledged adult human consciousness. Under his hierarchy of "Soul sizes", most animals have enough consciousness that they are self-aware and should be treated ethically (He himself became a vegetarian based on these considerations).

Based on Hofstadter's considerations, either you can recreate such homonids, but on the condition of treating them ethically, and presumably according a minimum number of rights, or if you are not willing/able to do that, refrain from recreating them.

Answer 2

Many contemporary utilitarians and consequentialists (such as Peter Singer) don't care whether the pleasure/pain is being experienced by a self-aware being or not. Thus, they wouldn't care about the distinction between "intelligence" and "self-awareness" wherever that would be drawn.

Instead, the fundamental question would be whether the amount of happiness in the world (or the amount of suffering in the world) would be maximized (or minimized) by the reintroduction of mammoths or neanderthals.

This consideration only begins to frame the problem of how to consider this. A second consideration is whether we are looking at actual happiness achieved or at reasonably expectable happiness that might occur.

Those who side with the former are going to be more apt to be what are called "act utilitarians" who make judgments de novo at each moment. Thus, for instance, they might say 'let's give it a shot!' and make some neanderthals. If that turned out to make a large number of human people happy or provided us with benefits and didn't create an extreme amount of suffering for the neanderthals, they would say it turned out well. Well, until it doesn't. But if it was just the neanderthals who were suffering, it seems a purist act utilitarian should not have a problem with killing them all.

Rule utilitarians, in contrast, are trying to maximize happiness by coming up with a framework that they think will probably yield maximal happiness. To do so, they are going to think about the potential suffering and unhappiness neanderthals could unleash more carefully than act utilitarians before they go ahead and make them.

I take it that many (if not all) the concerns would be scientific. But the science is not so difficult to imagine -- would creating them create risk for diseases spreading (mutates in one species jumps to the other)? Would they be treated with sufficient dignity to live enjoyable lives?

A third consideration is the harm principle which Mill suggests in On Liberty. At the simplest, do we accept doing harm to some in order to maximize happiness for the many or not? If yes, then there's less reasons to worry about experimenting on making them. If no, then there's good reasons to think we should not even try this experiment as undoubtedly there'd be several trial runs resulting in dead neanderthals.

Answer 3

Revived Neanderthals would be unlikely to be able to interact with the present human population, and so would need almost certainly to be geographically confined if not even more restricted in their movements. It is also hard to see how we could recreate the environment to which in their prime they were adjusted.

We could treat them with respect but any existing environment or environment created for them would almost certainly be more or less alien and deprive them of a life of full flourishing. In this respect they are different from, say, the Dodo, which could readily adjust to a range of existing environments including probably the one in which they were eliminated in the 17th century.

Answer 4

Your question is flawed by several assumptions:

• H. sapiens neanderthalensis burial practices suggest the possibility of self-consciousness, not just intelligence. Moreover, other more distantly related higher apes have been shown to be self-aware, so it would be quite a leap to assume neanderthalensis wasn't.

• While the positioning of their hyoid bone would have prevented speech akin to an adult H. sapiens sapiens, they would have the sound-producing ability of a sapiens infant or toddler. Further, they definitely had well-developed Wernicke's and Broca's areas, suggesting long-term use of communication of some kind, if not language proper. They also carry the FOXP2 gene related to language.

• Our ability to communicate with Neanderthals would be better than our ability to communicate with bonobos who can use language at about a 5-year-old human level—not the level at which we communicate with pets.

• Also, sapiens & neanderthalensis absolutely interbred with one another—which is why the designation as Homo sapiens nenderthalensis is proper. Simply interbreeding and out-competing them would have been enough to force them into extinction; the idea that we exterminated them is possible, but still hotly contested.

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I'd suggest editing your question so it doesn't spread misinformation. Your quoted, bold section is enough.

Answer 5

Your question requires we assume that conditions that would result in a need for a close ethical examination are not-present/false.

If the clone as adults are the equivalent of dogs, then whatever stance you have on the cloning of dogs should apply to them.

If on the other hand, you feel that you might possibly be cloning Einstein, MLK or the other LBJ, it's a bit different...