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Jul 12, 2017 at 18:44 comment added user26700 It seems like you say L.D. in the way the blurb gives it treats with neither "idea" or "person". Whereas you say, contradicting that, it is "almost the exact opposite". I suppose one would have to drop the distinction between philosophy and something else, if one treated the text that openly. It might show the thesis against stable truth in a way, against 'genre'. Apply the same thing to the world, as to the text, then you see the larger point of a particular brand of relativism. Man's own intention is at stake, because it is slandered by dominant ideology theory, physics, etc..
Jul 12, 2017 at 7:02 history edited user22791 CC BY-SA 3.0
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Jul 12, 2017 at 6:57 history edited user22791 CC BY-SA 3.0
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Jul 11, 2017 at 12:35 answer added Not_Here timeline score: 1
Jul 11, 2017 at 11:10 comment added user25714 @Isaacson ok, though i still think the discussion is unclear because you don't demarcate the question from the intentional fallacy but insist it doesn't cover it
Jul 11, 2017 at 7:43 comment added user22791 @idiotan He's a professor of English Literature, whilst that doesn't preclude pretension, I think it more likely he used the term "deconstructionism" because it's a term he uses accurately and appropriately on a day-to-day basis.
Jul 11, 2017 at 7:29 comment added user25714 @Isaacson i suppose it comes across that you're asking about deconstruction because you do so explicitly, but it's not clear in the question why an answer from the older concept would not suffice, and for this reason the question is quite confusing. it reads like you just added 'deconstruction' cos your friend in pretentious
Jul 11, 2017 at 7:18 comment added user25714 @Conifold i think you misunderstand what i meant by "completely un-invested" i don't mean that they cannot (it's impossible) to see the author's intent
Jul 11, 2017 at 6:51 comment added user22791 @idiotan Deconstructionism (of any sort) differs from New Criticism in that it does not accept a unity of meaning, but rather looks to see conflicts and contradictions, it is this approach that I was thinking of particularly, although examples of New Criticism applied to philosophical texts would be very interesting.
Jul 11, 2017 at 6:48 comment added user22791 @Not_Here Yes, that's exactly it, I'd not thought of that. Your comment would make a perfectly satisfactory answer.
Jul 11, 2017 at 6:34 comment added user22791 What I'm asking is whether anyone has applied Johnson's form of deconstructionism to philosophical text (i.e Kant's categorical imperative could be interpreted as meaning ..., rather than focussing on what Kant actually meant by further examination of his other writing).
Jul 11, 2017 at 6:34 comment added user22791 @Conifold So for example a deconstructionist interpretation of Shakespeare might infer a Marxist, or even Buddhist meaning (see Atkins and Bergeron or Howe respectively), despite the fact that this could not possibly have been Shakespeare's intention (his having had no concept of either at the time) nor are the critics claiming it was, merely that it is a "possible" interpretation as Johnson (an early literary deconstructionist) put it. Derrida, on the other hand, is implying that the contradictions and subtext are real artefacts, not just possible ones.
Jul 11, 2017 at 2:57 comment added Conifold If that is the case "completely" does not happen in the literary criticism either, after all the text should still make it possible and the author's intent is still looked at, even as one among many. And to the extent that it does one sees a lot of "this is the best way to interpret X today, even if X did not mean it that way" in philosophy, some even see it as charity.
Jul 11, 2017 at 2:44 comment added user25714 @Conifold i think he's asking about whether anyone is ever completely un-invested in "what a particular philosopher specifically meant" despite studying or using their work
Jul 11, 2017 at 2:35 comment added user25714 the intentional fallacy predates deconstruction, it's from new criticism. i suppose that deconstruction uses philosophy very liberally, and is more invested in what you can get a text to mean than what it conventionally does
Jul 11, 2017 at 2:24 review Suggested edits
Jul 11, 2017 at 6:44
Jul 10, 2017 at 23:54 comment added Conifold Sorry, it is hard for me to tell from your phrasing whether you are looking for people being invested into what a particular philosopher specifically meant, or into what he should have meant for his system to work better. But it seems that both kinds of investment are ubiquitous in philosophy, in exegesis/commentary and appropriation by successors, respectively, so perhaps I am not getting what "literary deconstructionism in philosophy" means.
Jul 10, 2017 at 17:21 comment added user20153 you may find Michael Forster's article on Hermeneutics useful. pdf at philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/forster.html
Jul 10, 2017 at 17:18 comment added user20153 isn't Derrida the godfather of pretty much all deconstructionisms?
Jul 10, 2017 at 12:40 comment added Not_Here Obviously Kripke is not a deconstructionist but if you are focusing on the idea of "possible interpretations being as valid as actual interpretations" then his comments on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations comes to mind. The rule following paradox that Kripke outlines is agreed upon that neither Kripke nor Wittgenstein believe it themselves and is often attributed to a third, fake person called "Kripenstein." I don't think I would truly call this literary deconstructionism, but it does fit your definition.
Jul 10, 2017 at 12:32 comment added Mauro ALLEGRANZA You can see U.Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation (1992).
Jul 10, 2017 at 8:18 history asked user22791 CC BY-SA 3.0