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I believe what you describe is close to what is called anachronism (literally, out of time -ism):

"In historical writing, the most common type of anachronism is the adoption of the political, social or cultural concerns and assumptions of one era to interpret or evaluate the events and actions of another... Arthur Marwick has argued that "a grasp of the fact that past societies are very different from our own, and ... very difficult to get to know" is an essential and fundamental skill of the professional historian; and that "anachronism is still one of the most obvious faults when the unqualified (those expert in other disciplines, perhaps) attempt to do history". Anachronism in academic writing is considered at best embarrassing..."

This is usually used more broadly and on a greater time scale than yours, but in its ethical application the idea is the same: decisions and actions should be judged based on information and context available at the time, not from the all-knowing perspective available with the benefit of hindsight. "No second guessing", "no Monday morning quarter backing" are lower brow expressions of this sentiment.

Your abortion example puts an additional twist on it however, and a controversial one. What you seem to argue is, roughly, that abortion is not murder because the "person" in question (fetus) is only a potential person and therefore does not yet exist. This sentiment is also expressed as "to die is not the same as never to be born". This is a defensible position, but you'll have harder time dismissing the opposite one as anachronistic.

There is a well established school of thought which holds that potential existence is also a kind of existence, and it carries moral value with it. In other words, it is not necessary for people to place themselves in two different time frames at once, they can argue from a single time frame, but acknowledge its potentialities in addition to actualities. The device of subjunctive mood and the use of counterfactuals you mention evolved precisely for such purposes. Felt discusses potentiality in the context of free will and responsibility in Impossible Worlds:

The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.

The real issue, as you yourself point out at the end, is how to balance the likelihood of consequences against their utility and/or moral value, and that is the crux of most intractable problems in ethical consequentialism. It would be so much easier if we had a firm grasp and consensus on what is or is not a "sufficiently removed" consequence, and how much of an existence potential existence is. Slippery slope is another kind of situation, whose being or not being a fallacy turns on such judgements.

I believe what you describe is close to what is called anachronism (literally, out of time -ism):

"In historical writing, the most common type of anachronism is the adoption of the political, social or cultural concerns and assumptions of one era to interpret or evaluate the events and actions of another... Arthur Marwick has argued that "a grasp of the fact that past societies are very different from our own, and ... very difficult to get to know" is an essential and fundamental skill of the professional historian; and that "anachronism is still one of the most obvious faults when the unqualified (those expert in other disciplines, perhaps) attempt to do history". Anachronism in academic writing is considered at best embarrassing..."

This is usually used more broadly and on a greater time scale than yours, but in its ethical application the idea is the same: decisions and actions should be judged based on information and context available at the time, not from the all-knowing perspective available with the benefit of hindsight. "No second guessing", "no Monday morning quarter backing" are lower brow expressions of this sentiment.

The OP abortion example puts an additional twist on it, however, and a controversial one. What it seems to argue is, roughly, that abortion is not murder because the "person" in question (fetus) is only a potential person, and therefore does not yet exist. This sentiment is also expressed as "to die is not the same as never to be born". This is a defensible position, but one will have harder time dismissing the opposite one as anachronistic.

There is a well established school of thought which holds that potential existence is also a kind of existence, and it carries moral value with it. In other words, it is not necessary for people to place themselves in two different time frames at once, they can argue from a single time frame, but acknowledge its potentialities in addition to actualities. The device of subjunctive mood and the use of counterfactuals you mention evolved precisely for such purposes. Felt discusses potentiality in the context of free will and responsibility in Impossible Worlds:

The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.

The real issue, as you yourself point out at the end, is how to balance the likelihood of consequences against their utility and/or moral value, and that is the crux of most intractable problems in ethical consequentialism. It would be so much easier if we had a firm grasp and consensus on what is or is not a "sufficiently removed" consequence, and how much of an existence potential existence is. Slippery slope is another kind of situation, whose being or not being a fallacy turns on such judgements.

I believe what you describe is close to what is called anachronism (literally, out of time -ism):

"In historical writing, the most common type of anachronism is the adoption of the political, social or cultural concerns and assumptions of one era to interpret or evaluate the events and actions of another... Arthur Marwick has argued that "a grasp of the fact that past societies are very different from our own, and ... very difficult to get to know" is an essential and fundamental skill of the professional historian; and that "anachronism is still one of the most obvious faults when the unqualified (those expert in other disciplines, perhaps) attempt to do history". Anachronism in academic writing is considered at best embarrassing..."

This is usually used more broadly and on a greater time scale than yours, but in its ethical application the idea is the same: decisions and actions should be judged based on information and context available at the time, not from the all-knowing perspective available with the benefit of hindsight. "No second guessing", "no Monday morning quarter backing" are lower brow expressions of this sentiment.

Your abortion example puts an additional twist on it however, and a controversial one. What you seem to argue is, roughly, that abortion is not murder because the "person" in question (fetus) is only a potential person and therefore does not yet exist. This sentiment is also expressed as "to die is not the same as never to be born". This is a defensible position, but you'll have harder time dismissing the opposite one as anachronistic.

There is a well established school of thought, which holds that potential existence is also a kind of existence, and it carries moral value with it. In other words, it is not necessary for people to place themselves in two different time frames at once, they can argue from a single time frame, but acknowledge its potentialities in addition to actualities. The device of subjunctive mood and the use of counterfactuals you mention evolved precisely for such purposes. Felt discusses potentiality in the context of free will and responsibility in Impossible Worlds:

The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.

The real issue, as you yourself point out at the end, is how to balance the likelihood of consequences against their utility and/or moral value, and that is the crux of most intractable problems in ethical consequentialism. It would be so much easier if we had a firm grasp and consensus on what is or is not a "sufficiently removed" consequence, and how much of an existence potential existence is. Slippery slope is another kind of situation, whose being or not being a fallacy turns on such judgements.

I believe what you describe is close to what is called anachronism (literally, out of time -ism):

"In historical writing, the most common type of anachronism is the adoption of the political, social or cultural concerns and assumptions of one era to interpret or evaluate the events and actions of another... Arthur Marwick has argued that "a grasp of the fact that past societies are very different from our own, and ... very difficult to get to know" is an essential and fundamental skill of the professional historian; and that "anachronism is still one of the most obvious faults when the unqualified (those expert in other disciplines, perhaps) attempt to do history". Anachronism in academic writing is considered at best embarrassing..."

This is usually used more broadly and on a greater time scale than yours, but in its ethical application the idea is the same: decisions and actions should be judged based on information and context available at the time, not from the all-knowing perspective available with the benefit of hindsight. "No second guessing", "no Monday morning quarter backing" are lower brow expressions of this sentiment.

Your abortion example puts an additional twist on it however, and a controversial one. What you seem to argue is, roughly, that abortion is not murder because the "person" in question (fetus) is only a potential person and therefore does not yet exist. This sentiment is also expressed as "to die is not the same as never to be born". This is a defensible position, but you'll have harder time dismissing the opposite one as anachronistic.

There is a well established school of thought which holds that potential existence is also a kind of existence, and it carries moral value with it. In other words, it is not necessary for people to place themselves in two different time frames at once, they can argue from a single time frame, but acknowledge its potentialities in addition to actualities. The device of subjunctive mood and the use of counterfactuals you mention evolved precisely for such purposes. Felt discusses potentiality in the context of free will and responsibility in Impossible Worlds:

The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.

The real issue, as you yourself point out at the end, is how to balance the likelihood of consequences against their utility and/or moral value, and that is the crux of most intractable problems in ethical consequentialism. It would be so much easier if we had a firm grasp and consensus on what is or is not a "sufficiently removed" consequence, and how much of an existence potential existence is. Slippery slope is another kind of situation, whose being or not being a fallacy turns on such judgements.

I believe what you describe is close to what is called anachronism (literally, out of time -ism):

"In historical writing, the most common type of anachronism is the adoption of the political, social or cultural concerns and assumptions of one era to interpret or evaluate the events and actions of another... Arthur Marwick has argued that "a grasp of the fact that past societies are very different from our own, and ... very difficult to get to know" is an essential and fundamental skill of the professional historian; and that "anachronism is still one of the most obvious faults when the unqualified (those expert in other disciplines, perhaps) attempt to do history". Anachronism in academic writing is considered at best embarrassing..."

This is usually used more broadly and on a greater time scale than yours, but in its ethical application the idea is the same: decisions and actions should be judged based on information and context available at the time, not from the all-knowing perspective available with the benefit of hindsight. "No second guessing", "no Monday morning quarter backing" are lower brow expressions of this sentiment.

Your abortion example puts an additional twist on it however, and a controversial one. What you seem to argue is, roughly, that abortion is not murder because the "person" in question (fetus) is only a potential person and therefore does not yet exist. This sentiment is also expressed as "to die is not the same as never to be born". This is a defensible position, but you'll have harder time dismissing the opposite one as anachronistic.

There is a well established school of thought, which holds that potential existence is also a kind of existence, and it carries moral value with it. In other words, it is not necessary for people to place themselves in two different time frames at once, they can argue from a single time frame, but acknowledge its potentialities in addition to actualities. The grammar device of subjunctive mood evolved for such purposes. Felt discusses potentiality in the context of free will and responsibility in Impossible Worlds:

The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.

The real issue, as you yourself point out, is how to balance the likelihood of consequences against their utility and/or moral value, and that is the crux of most intractable problems in ethical consequentialism. It would be so much easier if we had a firm grasp and consensus on what is or is not a "sufficiently removed" consequence, and how much of an existence potential existence is. Slippery slope is another kind of situation, whose being or not being a fallacy turns on such judgements.

I believe what you describe is close to what is called anachronism (literally, out of time -ism):

"In historical writing, the most common type of anachronism is the adoption of the political, social or cultural concerns and assumptions of one era to interpret or evaluate the events and actions of another... Arthur Marwick has argued that "a grasp of the fact that past societies are very different from our own, and ... very difficult to get to know" is an essential and fundamental skill of the professional historian; and that "anachronism is still one of the most obvious faults when the unqualified (those expert in other disciplines, perhaps) attempt to do history". Anachronism in academic writing is considered at best embarrassing..."

This is usually used more broadly and on a greater time scale than yours, but in its ethical application the idea is the same: decisions and actions should be judged based on information and context available at the time, not from the all-knowing perspective available with the benefit of hindsight. "No second guessing", "no Monday morning quarter backing" are lower brow expressions of this sentiment.

Your abortion example puts an additional twist on it however, and a controversial one. What you seem to argue is, roughly, that abortion is not murder because the "person" in question (fetus) is only a potential person and therefore does not yet exist. This sentiment is also expressed as "to die is not the same as never to be born". This is a defensible position, but you'll have harder time dismissing the opposite one as anachronistic.

There is a well established school of thought, which holds that potential existence is also a kind of existence, and it carries moral value with it. In other words, it is not necessary for people to place themselves in two different time frames at once, they can argue from a single time frame, but acknowledge its potentialities in addition to actualities. The device of subjunctive mood and the use of counterfactuals you mention evolved precisely for such purposes. Felt discusses potentiality in the context of free will and responsibility in Impossible Worlds:

The actualists are therefore right in denying an independence to the possible. On the other hand, to be potentially is really a way to be, even though it is not to be actually. And this of course is just what Aristotle said in response to Parmenides, who conceived of only one way of being, being in actuality.

The real issue, as you yourself point out at the end, is how to balance the likelihood of consequences against their utility and/or moral value, and that is the crux of most intractable problems in ethical consequentialism. It would be so much easier if we had a firm grasp and consensus on what is or is not a "sufficiently removed" consequence, and how much of an existence potential existence is. Slippery slope is another kind of situation, whose being or not being a fallacy turns on such judgements.