Context: This question follows up on Under physicalism, can my consciousness reappear in a different body?.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that some form of physicalism is true. Imagine my wife is killed in front of me using advanced technology that ensures her death is instantaneous and painless. I react with anger and sorrow as a result. However, one minute later, the perpetrators—revealed to be "pranksters"—use extremely advanced technology to "fix" the situation by creating an exact replica of my wife. This perfect clone is made from different materials but possesses the exact same memories as my original wife and has no memory of the murder. For all practical purposes, she is identical to my wife before the murder, even though I can still see my original wife's dead body. Suppose the "pranksters" also compensate me with 1 million dollars for the one minute of "inconvenience".
Under physicalism, should I still feel sad about the death of my original wife? In other words, would my being sad about the death of my original wife be justified despite the clone and the monetary compensation?
Note: for the sake of argument, you can also safely assume that I have a justified true belief that my "new" wife is identical to my murdered wife prior to the murder. In other words, you can safely disregard the epistemological issues associated with how I could possibly know if my new wife is indeed identical. Assume that somehow I know she is.