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J D
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John Searle, a famous direct realist, in his Seeing Things as They Are (GB) addresses the question of various versions of the Argument from Illusion. A lightweight answer to your question comes form Seale arguing what Austin argued. Starting on page 89, The bent stick and the elliptical coin, he explicates:

The argument against Direct Realism in these cases claims that I did actually see *something bent and something elliptical... I saw the bent appearance of the stick and the elliptical appearance of the coin, so the elliptical and bent appearances were the objects of my perception... I do not see objects but only sense data.

Of course, the idea that there is an intermediate representation Searle objects to. He calls it the Bad Argument throughout the book, and offers a different theory of perception to eliminate it as the thesis of his book. In the case of the illusions of the bent stick and the elliptical coin, he goes on to say:

The literal false step in the argument is the one that says: because I directly perceive something elliptical and because the coin itself is not elliptical, it follows I do not directly perceive the coin. But it does not follow... There is no way I can see the appearance of the coin without seeing the coin... it does not follow that I do not see the coin.

What Searle doing here is challenging the notion that the coin in from one perspective is not the coin (the elliptical coin) while it is from another direction (the round coin). We'll say more about this momentarily:

But this is not to describe an actual bent or elliptical object of his perception but rather the conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience... which has intentional content which may or may not be satisified, and the actual object and state of affairs... perceived with varying degrees of accuracy.

So, my interpretation of this would include the terms intension and extension borrowing from Frege's intellectual heirs. Obviously, we have the same referrent, the same extension involved in the analysis, the coin. But as I see it, what Searle does is challenge the idea that one intension of the coin, the one involving round property, is somehow 'real' and the other intension, the one involving the elliptical property, is somehow 'appearance'. Both of them are directly the coin, but perceived, as he says, under different "conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience".

Think about it. In the question of Hesperus and Phosporous, which is actually Venus? Should we accept that Morning Star is the real Venus, and the Evening Star is a mere appearance? No, we simply accept that in both cases, we observe Venus, but under different times and conditions. In both cases, we observe Venus directly.

John Searle, a famous direct realist, in his Seeing Things as They Are (GB) addresses the question of various versions of the Argument from Illusion. A lightweight answer to your question comes form Seale arguing what Austin argued. Starting on page 89, The bent stick and the elliptical coin, he explicates:

The argument against Direct Realism in these cases claims that I did actually see *something bent and something elliptical... I saw the bent appearance of the stick and the elliptical appearance of the coin, so the elliptical and bent appearances were the objects of my perception... I do not see objects but only sense data.

Of course, the idea that there is an intermediate representation Searle objects to. He calls it the Bad Argument throughout the book, and offers a different theory of perception to eliminate it as the thesis of his book. In the case of the illusions of the bent stick and the elliptical coin, he goes on to say:

The literal false step in the argument is the one that says: because I directly perceive something elliptical and because the coin itself is not elliptical, it follows I do not directly perceive the coin. But it does not follow... There is no way I can see the appearance of the coin without seeing the coin... it does not follow that I do not see the coin.

What Searle doing here is challenging the notion that the coin in from perspective is not the coin (the elliptical coin) while it is from another direction (the round coin). We'll say more about this momentarily:

But this is not to describe an actual bent or elliptical object of his perception but rather the conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience... which has intentional content which may or may not be satisified, and the actual object and state of affairs... perceived with varying degrees of accuracy.

So, my interpretation of this would include the terms intension and extension borrowing from Frege's intellectual heirs. Obviously, we have the same referrent, the same extension involved in the analysis, the coin. But as I see it, what Searle does is challenge the idea that one intension of the coin, the one involving round property, is somehow 'real' and the other intension, the one involving the elliptical property, is somehow 'appearance'. Both of them are directly the coin, but perceived, as he says, under different "conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience".

Think about it. In the question of Hesperus and Phosporous, which is actually Venus? Should we accept that Morning Star is the real Venus, and the Evening Star is a mere appearance? No, we simply accept that in both cases, we observe Venus, but under different times and conditions. In both cases, we observe Venus directly.

John Searle, a famous direct realist, in his Seeing Things as They Are (GB) addresses the question of various versions of the Argument from Illusion. A lightweight answer to your question comes form Seale arguing what Austin argued. Starting on page 89, The bent stick and the elliptical coin, he explicates:

The argument against Direct Realism in these cases claims that I did actually see *something bent and something elliptical... I saw the bent appearance of the stick and the elliptical appearance of the coin, so the elliptical and bent appearances were the objects of my perception... I do not see objects but only sense data.

Of course, the idea that there is an intermediate representation Searle objects to. He calls it the Bad Argument throughout the book, and offers a different theory of perception to eliminate it as the thesis of his book. In the case of the illusions of the bent stick and the elliptical coin, he goes on to say:

The literal false step in the argument is the one that says: because I directly perceive something elliptical and because the coin itself is not elliptical, it follows I do not directly perceive the coin. But it does not follow... There is no way I can see the appearance of the coin without seeing the coin... it does not follow that I do not see the coin.

What Searle doing here is challenging the notion that the coin from one perspective is not the coin (the elliptical coin) while it is from another direction (the round coin). We'll say more about this momentarily:

But this is not to describe an actual bent or elliptical object of his perception but rather the conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience... which has intentional content which may or may not be satisified, and the actual object and state of affairs... perceived with varying degrees of accuracy.

So, my interpretation of this would include the terms intension and extension borrowing from Frege's intellectual heirs. Obviously, we have the same referrent, the same extension involved in the analysis, the coin. But as I see it, what Searle does is challenge the idea that one intension of the coin, the one involving round property, is somehow 'real' and the other intension, the one involving the elliptical property, is somehow 'appearance'. Both of them are directly the coin, but perceived, as he says, under different "conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience".

Think about it. In the question of Hesperus and Phosporous, which is actually Venus? Should we accept that Morning Star is the real Venus, and the Evening Star is a mere appearance? No, we simply accept that in both cases, we observe Venus, but under different times and conditions. In both cases, we observe Venus directly.

Source Link
J D
J D
  • 29.1k
  • 3
  • 24
  • 106

John Searle, a famous direct realist, in his Seeing Things as They Are (GB) addresses the question of various versions of the Argument from Illusion. A lightweight answer to your question comes form Seale arguing what Austin argued. Starting on page 89, The bent stick and the elliptical coin, he explicates:

The argument against Direct Realism in these cases claims that I did actually see *something bent and something elliptical... I saw the bent appearance of the stick and the elliptical appearance of the coin, so the elliptical and bent appearances were the objects of my perception... I do not see objects but only sense data.

Of course, the idea that there is an intermediate representation Searle objects to. He calls it the Bad Argument throughout the book, and offers a different theory of perception to eliminate it as the thesis of his book. In the case of the illusions of the bent stick and the elliptical coin, he goes on to say:

The literal false step in the argument is the one that says: because I directly perceive something elliptical and because the coin itself is not elliptical, it follows I do not directly perceive the coin. But it does not follow... There is no way I can see the appearance of the coin without seeing the coin... it does not follow that I do not see the coin.

What Searle doing here is challenging the notion that the coin in from perspective is not the coin (the elliptical coin) while it is from another direction (the round coin). We'll say more about this momentarily:

But this is not to describe an actual bent or elliptical object of his perception but rather the conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience... which has intentional content which may or may not be satisified, and the actual object and state of affairs... perceived with varying degrees of accuracy.

So, my interpretation of this would include the terms intension and extension borrowing from Frege's intellectual heirs. Obviously, we have the same referrent, the same extension involved in the analysis, the coin. But as I see it, what Searle does is challenge the idea that one intension of the coin, the one involving round property, is somehow 'real' and the other intension, the one involving the elliptical property, is somehow 'appearance'. Both of them are directly the coin, but perceived, as he says, under different "conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual experience".

Think about it. In the question of Hesperus and Phosporous, which is actually Venus? Should we accept that Morning Star is the real Venus, and the Evening Star is a mere appearance? No, we simply accept that in both cases, we observe Venus, but under different times and conditions. In both cases, we observe Venus directly.