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There are multiple competing theories about consciousness (SEP), and they give different answers to your question.

Many of the physicalist theories about consciousness assume an identity theory (SEP) between either neurology, or a function and consciousness. The neurology-based identity theories would hold that non-living things cannot have consciousness, as they don't have neurology. The functionalist theories (SEP), would hold that non-living things can do the functions of a brain, and therefore they could have consciousness.

The problem that identity theories tend to have, is that we know we do not have consciousness in many cases when their identities are satisfied -- IE recursive neural nets do not always exhibit consciousness, contrary to Paul Churchland's identity claim. Without 100% identity, these theories run into Chalmer's Hard Problem of Consciousness -- if there is no necessary coupling, ascribing consciousness on some occasions to a substrate is -- ad hoc and unpredicted.

Both of the above are examples of REDUCTIONIST physicalism, where mind just IS some feature of the substrate. Most physicalist theories of consciousness today are emergent (SEP) physicalism, where consciousness is something new, or added, and is not ONLY the reduced properties of the system. Emergent physicalism struggles to provide a clear concept of emergence, and therefore of testability for these theories. Jaegwon Kim, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough (GB), actually claims that there can be no emergent physicalism, because if physicalism's assumption of causal closure of the physical is true, then all causal consciousness reduces.

William James and Karl Popper proposed the evolutionary test case for any theory of consciousness that does not hold that consciousness is causal: if consciousness is only occasionally and not necessarily associated with an "identity" substrate, then evolutionary variance would decouple any apparent coupling. This would lead to an incoherent relationship between consciousness and the behavior of a living thing. The coherent coupling we see requires that consciousness be causal, independently of the substrate. Popper argued therefore that consciousness is emergent from the physical, but is
causal. This is interactive emergent dualism (wiley.com). Under interactive emergent dualism, whatever caused consciousness to emerge within living things, could in principle also occur in non-living things, but this is unlikely. Other posters may want to comment, but I am not aware of any failed test cases for Popperian emergent dualism, other than the past life and near death studies.

Aside from these emergent theories of consciousness arising from matter, there are also idealist views among some scientists, in which matter emerges from consciousness. In idealist models (SEP), non-living things could very well be conscious. Idealism struggles to explain the coherence and stubbornness of matter.

Interactive spiritual dualism holds that matter and spirit interact. In spiritual dualism, a spirit could in principle ensoul all sorts f non-living things, as well as living things, so under interactive spiritual dualism yes, non-living things could be conscious. The major challenging test cases for spiritual dualism are brain damage studies that show reduced consciousness.

There are multiple competing theories about consciousness (SEP), and they give different answers to your question.

Many of the physicalist theories about consciousness assume an identity theory (SEP) between either neurology, or a function and consciousness. The neurology-based identity theories would hold that non-living things cannot have consciousness, as they don't have neurology. The functionalist theories (SEP), would hold that non-living things can do the functions of a brain, and therefore they could have consciousness.

The problem that identity theories tend to have, is that we know we do not have consciousness in many cases when their identities are satisfied -- IE recursive neural nets do not always exhibit consciousness, contrary to Paul Churchland's identity claim https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R5048CH7VMV78?ref=pf_ov_at_pdctrvw_srp. Without 100% identity, these theories run into Chalmer's Hard Problem of Consciousness -- if there is no necessary coupling, ascribing consciousness on some occasions to a substrate is -- ad hoc and unpredicted.

Both of the above are examples of REDUCTIONIST physicalism, where mind just IS some feature of the substrate. Most physicalist theories of consciousness today are emergent (SEP) physicalism, where consciousness is something new, or added, and is not ONLY the reduced properties of the system. Emergent physicalism struggles to provide a clear concept of emergence, and therefore of testability for these theories. Jaegwon Kim, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough (GB), actually claims that there can be no emergent physicalism, because if physicalism's assumption of causal closure of the physical is true, then all causal consciousness reduces.

William James and Karl Popper proposed the evolutionary test case for any theory of consciousness that does not hold that consciousness is causal: if consciousness is only occasionally and not necessarily associated with an "identity" substrate, then evolutionary variance would decouple any apparent coupling. This would lead to an incoherent relationship between consciousness and the behavior of a living thing. The coherent coupling we see requires that consciousness be causal, independently of the substrate. Popper argued therefore that consciousness is emergent from the physical, but is
causal. This is interactive emergent dualism (wiley.com). Under interactive emergent dualism, whatever caused consciousness to emerge within living things, could in principle also occur in non-living things, but this is unlikely. Other posters may want to comment, but I am not aware of any failed test cases for Popperian emergent dualism, other than the past life and near death studies.

Aside from these emergent theories of consciousness arising from matter, there are also idealist views among some scientists, in which matter emerges from consciousness. In idealist models (SEP), non-living things could very well be conscious. Idealism struggles to explain the coherence and stubbornness of matter.

Interactive spiritual dualism holds that matter and spirit interact. In spiritual dualism, a spirit could in principle ensoul all sorts f non-living things, as well as living things, so under interactive spiritual dualism yes, non-living things could be conscious. The major challenging test cases for spiritual dualism are brain damage studies that show reduced consciousness.

There are multiple competing theories about consciousness, and they give different answers to your question.

Many of the physicalist theories about consciousness assume an identity theory between either neurology, or a function and consciousness. The neurology-based identity theories would hold that non-living things cannot have consciousness, as they don't have neurology. The functionalist theories, would hold that non-living things can do the functions of a brain, and therefore they could have consciousness.

The problem that identity theories tend to have, is that we know we do not have consciousness in many cases when their identities are satisfied -- IE recursive neural nets do not always exhibit consciousness, contrary to Paul Churchland's identity claim. Without 100% identity, these theories run into Chalmer's "Hard Problem of Consciousness" -- if there is no necessary coupling, ascribing consciousness on some occasions to a substrate is -- ad hoc and unpredicted.

Both of the above are examples of REDUCTIONIST physicalism, where mind just IS some feature of the substrate. Most physicalist theories of consciousness today are emergent physicalism, where consciousness is something new, or added, and is not ONLY the reduced properties of the system. Emergent physicalism struggles to provide a clear concept of emergence, and therefore of testability for these theories. Jaegwon Kim, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough, actually claims that there can be no emergent physicalism, because if physicalism's assumption of causal closure of the physical is true, then all causal consciousness reduces.

William James and Karl Popper proposed the evolutionary test case for any theory of consciousness that does not hold that consciousness is causal: if consciousness is only occasionally and not necessarily associated with an "identity" substrate, then evolutionary variance would decouple any apparent coupling. This would lead to an incoherent relationship between consciousness and the behavior of a living thing. The coherent coupling we see requires that consciousness be causal, independently of the substrate. Popper argued therefore that consciousness is emergent from the physical, but is
causal. This is interactive emergent dualism. Under interactive emergent dualism, whatever caused consciousness to emerge within living things, could in principle also occur in non-living things, but this is unlikely. Other posters may want to comment, but I am not aware of any failed test cases for Popperian emergent dualism, other than the past life and near death studies.

Aside from these emergent theories of consciousness arising from matter, there are also idealist views among some scientists, in which matter emerges from consciousness. In idealist models, non-living things could very well be conscious. Idealism struggles to explain the coherence and stubbornness of matter.

Interactive spiritual dualism holds that matter and spirit interact. In spiritual dualism, a spirit could in principle ensoul all sorts f non-living things, as well as living things, so under interactive spiritual dualism yes, non-living things could be conscious. The major challenging test cases for spiritual dualism are brain damage studies that show reduced consciousness.

There are multiple competing theories about consciousness (SEP), and they give different answers to your question.

Many of the physicalist theories about consciousness assume an identity theory (SEP) between either neurology, or a function and consciousness. The neurology-based identity theories would hold that non-living things cannot have consciousness, as they don't have neurology. The functionalist theories (SEP), would hold that non-living things can do the functions of a brain, and therefore they could have consciousness.

The problem that identity theories tend to have, is that we know we do not have consciousness in many cases when their identities are satisfied -- IE recursive neural nets do not always exhibit consciousness, contrary to Paul Churchland's identity claim. Without 100% identity, these theories run into Chalmer's Hard Problem of Consciousness -- if there is no necessary coupling, ascribing consciousness on some occasions to a substrate is -- ad hoc and unpredicted.

Both of the above are examples of REDUCTIONIST physicalism, where mind just IS some feature of the substrate. Most physicalist theories of consciousness today are emergent (SEP) physicalism, where consciousness is something new, or added, and is not ONLY the reduced properties of the system. Emergent physicalism struggles to provide a clear concept of emergence, and therefore of testability for these theories. Jaegwon Kim, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough (GB), actually claims that there can be no emergent physicalism, because if physicalism's assumption of causal closure of the physical is true, then all causal consciousness reduces.

William James and Karl Popper proposed the evolutionary test case for any theory of consciousness that does not hold that consciousness is causal: if consciousness is only occasionally and not necessarily associated with an "identity" substrate, then evolutionary variance would decouple any apparent coupling. This would lead to an incoherent relationship between consciousness and the behavior of a living thing. The coherent coupling we see requires that consciousness be causal, independently of the substrate. Popper argued therefore that consciousness is emergent from the physical, but is
causal. This is interactive emergent dualism (wiley.com). Under interactive emergent dualism, whatever caused consciousness to emerge within living things, could in principle also occur in non-living things, but this is unlikely. Other posters may want to comment, but I am not aware of any failed test cases for Popperian emergent dualism, other than the past life and near death studies.

Aside from these emergent theories of consciousness arising from matter, there are also idealist views among some scientists, in which matter emerges from consciousness. In idealist models (SEP), non-living things could very well be conscious. Idealism struggles to explain the coherence and stubbornness of matter.

Interactive spiritual dualism holds that matter and spirit interact. In spiritual dualism, a spirit could in principle ensoul all sorts f non-living things, as well as living things, so under interactive spiritual dualism yes, non-living things could be conscious. The major challenging test cases for spiritual dualism are brain damage studies that show reduced consciousness.

There are multiple competing theories about consciousness, and they give different answers to your question.

Many of the physicalist theories about consciousness assume an identity theory between either neurology, or a function and consciousness. The neurology-based identity theories would hold that non-living things cannot have consciousness, as they don't have neurology. The functionalist theories, would hold that non-living things can do the functions of a brain, and therefore they could have consciousness.

The problem that identity theories tend to have, is that we know we do not have consciousness in many cases when their identities are satisfied -- IE recursive neural nets do not always exhibit consciousness, contrary to Paul Churchland's identity claim. Without 100% identity, these theories run into Chalmer's "Hard Problem of Consciousness" -- if there is no necessary coupling, ascribing consciousness on some occasions to a substrate is -- ad hoc and unpredicted.

Both of the above are examples of REDUCTIONIST physicalism, where mind just IS some feature of the substrate. Most physicalist theories of consciousness today are emergent physicalism, where consciousness is something new, or added, and is not ONLY the reduced properties of the system. Emergent physicalism struggles to provide a clear concept of emergence, and therefore of testability for these theories. Jaegwon Kim, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough, actually claims that there can be no emergent physicalism, because if physicalism's assumption of causal closure of the physical is true, then all causal consciousness reduces.

William James and Karl Popper proposed the evolutionary test case for any theory of consciousness that does not hold that consciousness is causal: if consciousness is only occasionally and not necessarily associated with an "identity" substrate, then evolutionary variance would decouple any apparent coupling. This would lead to an incoherent relationship between consciousness and the behavior of a living thing. The coherent coupling we see requires that consciousness be causal, independently of the substrate. Popper argued therefore that consciousness is emergent from the physical, but is
causal. This is interactive emergent dualism.

There are multiple competing theories about consciousness, and they give different answers to your question.

Many of the physicalist theories about consciousness assume an identity theory between either neurology, or a function and consciousness. The neurology-based identity theories would hold that non-living things cannot have consciousness, as they don't have neurology. The functionalist theories, would hold that non-living things can do the functions of a brain, and therefore they could have consciousness.

The problem that identity theories tend to have, is that we know we do not have consciousness in many cases when their identities are satisfied -- IE recursive neural nets do not always exhibit consciousness, contrary to Paul Churchland's identity claim. Without 100% identity, these theories run into Chalmer's "Hard Problem of Consciousness" -- if there is no necessary coupling, ascribing consciousness on some occasions to a substrate is -- ad hoc and unpredicted.

Both of the above are examples of REDUCTIONIST physicalism, where mind just IS some feature of the substrate. Most physicalist theories of consciousness today are emergent physicalism, where consciousness is something new, or added, and is not ONLY the reduced properties of the system. Emergent physicalism struggles to provide a clear concept of emergence, and therefore of testability for these theories. Jaegwon Kim, in Physicalism or Something Near Enough, actually claims that there can be no emergent physicalism, because if physicalism's assumption of causal closure of the physical is true, then all causal consciousness reduces.

William James and Karl Popper proposed the evolutionary test case for any theory of consciousness that does not hold that consciousness is causal: if consciousness is only occasionally and not necessarily associated with an "identity" substrate, then evolutionary variance would decouple any apparent coupling. This would lead to an incoherent relationship between consciousness and the behavior of a living thing. The coherent coupling we see requires that consciousness be causal, independently of the substrate. Popper argued therefore that consciousness is emergent from the physical, but is
causal. This is interactive emergent dualism. Under interactive emergent dualism, whatever caused consciousness to emerge within living things, could in principle also occur in non-living things, but this is unlikely. Other posters may want to comment, but I am not aware of any failed test cases for Popperian emergent dualism, other than the past life and near death studies.

Aside from these emergent theories of consciousness arising from matter, there are also idealist views among some scientists, in which matter emerges from consciousness. In idealist models, non-living things could very well be conscious. Idealism struggles to explain the coherence and stubbornness of matter.

Interactive spiritual dualism holds that matter and spirit interact. In spiritual dualism, a spirit could in principle ensoul all sorts f non-living things, as well as living things, so under interactive spiritual dualism yes, non-living things could be conscious. The major challenging test cases for spiritual dualism are brain damage studies that show reduced consciousness.