Timeline for How can Telegram defend themselves from law enforcement action? [closed]
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
17 events
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| Jun 22 at 15:41 | history | closed |
ohwilleke user 55905 jeffronicus Joe W Jen |
Needs details or clarity | |
| Jun 20 at 23:46 | history | edited | Dust | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jun 20 at 23:44 | history | edited | Dust | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jun 20 at 8:20 | history | edited | Trish | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jun 20 at 2:59 | comment | added | Clockwork-Muse | Law enforcement doesn't target engineers, they don't serve the order to the engineer directly. It may not matter whether the engineer can access the relevant data, if the company says "that data is outside your jurisdiction, you have no right to access it, so we won't tell our employees to work on it". Microsoft won a case over emails stored in Ireland because of this. That aside, it's often generally possible to arrange things so that engineers do not have normal access to the relevant data anyways (such as to prevent spying on users generally). | |
| Jun 20 at 1:09 | answer | added | bdb484 | timeline score: 2 | |
| Jun 20 at 1:09 | comment | added | Dust | @user1937198 Even if several entities were involved, they are all ultimately controlled by one or two individuals which law enforcement could target, it is not unheard of for a CEO to respond regarding their companies actions in situations like this | |
| Jun 20 at 0:51 | answer | added | Greendrake | timeline score: 2 | |
| Jun 20 at 0:06 | comment | added | user1937198 | This is a complex question involving several layers. There are assumptions about what keys are needed during operations and where, what access different sub-entities within the organization have. "Sorry, I cannot access the database because I would need to connect to and retrieve the password from a server belonging to and administered by Telegram Netherlands", is a very different defense. | |
| Jun 19 at 23:26 | review | Close votes | |||
| Jun 22 at 15:41 | |||||
| Jun 19 at 23:25 | history | edited | Dust | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jun 19 at 23:23 | history | edited | Dust | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
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| Jun 19 at 23:17 | comment | added | Dust | @ohwilleke Thanks for the feedback, I'll try to rewrite some parts in a clearer way. It is a complex topic since it involves both the technical implementation of the encryption system, which I've tried to briefly explain, and also the legal ramifications of it. I would say the core of the question is maybe at which point does the effort required to access user data become unreasonable enough to provide a legal defense. | |
| Jun 19 at 23:16 | comment | added | ohwilleke | I'm having a hard time determining what you are really asking. The question and your musings on possible answers and the implications of different setups are so intertwined, it is hard to tell where one ends and the other begins. The final paragraph starts off looking like a question (although not quite the title question) but seems to answer itself later on in the same paragraph. I also added a subpoena tag as a subpoena would be more common than a law enforcement search warrant as a way to force disclosure of information in this context. "any thoughts on this" is not specific enough. | |
| Jun 19 at 23:13 | history | edited | ohwilleke |
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| S Jun 19 at 22:53 | review | First questions | |||
| Jun 20 at 1:10 | |||||
| S Jun 19 at 22:53 | history | asked | Dust | CC BY-SA 4.0 |