Ehud Olmert on Israel’s Two-Front War and the Fall of Netanyahu

In Ehud Olmert’s first major policy address as acting Israeli prime minister in 2006, he backed the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Since then, Olmert has been on the front lines of advocating for a two-state solution, overseeing the end of Israel’s 2006 Lebanon War and 2008 Gaza War as well as negotiating with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that were just short of a lasting peace.

More than 15 years later, Israel is facing another two-front conflict. But this time, Olmert’s longtime rival, Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu, is at the helm. Foreign Policy sat down with Olmert on the sidelines of the Aspen Ideas Festival to discuss Hezbollah’s military capabilities, Olmert’s postwar proposal for Gaza, Israel’s relations with the United States and the Arab world, and the unraveling of Netanyahu’s coalition.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Alexandra Sharp: If you had to name one thing, what would you say is the greatest threat to Israel’s future right now?

Ehud Olmert: The weakening of the solidarity within the Israeli society about what should be our national priorities: to end the war [in Gaza], to move forward into political solutions for outstanding wars with or threats of wars or hostilities with the Palestinians and [with Hezbollah] in the north, and to move forward to be part of a very important bloc of [Arab] countries which were traditionally our enemies but which can be our partners.

AS: Do you believe that a full-scale war with Hezbollah is imminent? Is it even a good idea for Israel to be conducting this sort of war right now?

EO: I think that this is reckless provocation. If there will be a comprehensive all-out war between us and Hezbollah, there will not be Hezbollah and probably not Lebanon after it. But [Israel] will also suffer a great deal, more than we have suffered up until now in all of the different wars that we had—in terms of civilian centers, not in terms of armies—because [Hezbollah] will be shooting at longer distances into the center of Israel. Hezbollah does have this capacity. We are fully aware of that, but I am not certain that they are anxious to stretch it to the point where they will try to use all of [their weapons]. That they feel that they can use it has more power than the actual use of it because once you use it, it’s used. You can’t threaten anymore.

Therefore, there should be an alternative, and there is an alternative. And the alternative is an agreement between Israel and the Lebanese government about the outstanding disputes concerning the border between Israel and Lebanon, which will imply some adaptations on the territorial issues in the north in return for a withdrawal of Hezbollah from the borderline. I prefer up until the Litani River line. That’s what we did in 2006. And I think that the concept of this is that it provides Hezbollah with the appearance of an achievement that, from their point of view, can be shown as a very significant, tangible achievement as a result of their participation in the war.

For the Israeli side, it will not be an appearance of great victory, but it will provide the necessary circumstances for the residents of the north to return back to their homes, which is of very important interest for Israel. Netanyahu needs the appearance of a big achievement. He needs, miraculously, something that will keep him alive. Alive means in power, unchallenged, valuable.

AS: How close is Netanyahu to losing control? Can we see a snap election coming to Israel?

EO: My guess is at the end of the year, beginning of the next year, there will be elections. I guess that if there will not be a solution [to the war]—and there is not likely to be a solution soon—then the religious parties will probably break the coalition.

A hostage deal at this point means the end of the war. The end of the war means that all hell will break loose the day after the exchange and that [Netanyahu] may lose the majority for his government. So, when he says we will end the war, we’ll move all of our forces to the north— yeah, by when will we end the war? He doesn’t say, and he doesn’t specify, and he doesn’t give any benchmark to have a rough idea of what time it can be. It’ll be another year for him.

AS: You wrote an article recently in Haaretz where you talked about the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. Is that something that is imminent?

EO: Absolutely, it’s imminent. Is Netanyahu’s plan prepared to do it? No. At the end, someone, probably someone else, will do it, but it will have to be done. Look, I will not pretend to say that I know what [Hamas leader] Yahya Sinwar thinks. But I know one thing. He holds in his hands the assets which are crucial for Israel. And I understood that had I been in a similar position, probably I would have not given [those assets] up unless I will get the only thing that really matters for me, which is the end of the war. So, Israel has to decide what is more important: to kill a few more terrorists, to lose more lives of Israeli soldiers, and possibly also to lose all the hostages. Or to say we reached a point where the continued military operation is not worth the cost.

AS: Is there still a future in this climate for a true two-state solution?

EO: It’s a very simple idea. It’s very difficult and complex and sensitive to accomplish, to implement it. Let’s assume [Israel] will do what no one thinks we can, which is to destroy completely Hamas. You can’t destroy completely a terrorist organization. You can weaken them dramatically, as we did. They lost thousands of their soldiers, and they lost most of their tonnage and most of their weapons and most of the launchers and most of the command positions and whatnot. But now, let’s assume for the sake of our discussion, that we can do it. No Palestinian Hamas. No one will remain alive.

There are still 6 million Palestinians. What are we going to do with the 6 million Palestinians? Is Israel anxious to continue to be an occupier forever? Is it possible? Is it not going to cost Israel the price of pain, of isolation, of boycott, of rejection? So, if there is an alternative political solution that will release Israel of the occupation, I’m ready to discuss it. But I haven’t heard from anyone that may propose to me, “OK, not a two-state. Something else that will not imply a continued Israeli occupation of 6 million people.” So, there is no alternative. There is only one solution.

The question is: Will Israel have the power and determination, the vision and the leadership to move forward? And will the Palestinians have the leadership and the vision and the strength to overcome their differences and to embark on meaningful negotiations? It will happen. The question is whether it will happen sooner or whether we’ll have to pay in blood and they will have to pay in blood.

But we are not going to pull out from Gaza, and [the United States] will not urge us to pull out from Gaza, unless there is an alternative force that would prevent Hamas from returning into any kind of government position.

AS: And what would that force be?

EO: Preferably Palestinian and moderate Arab countries that will take over. For me, Gaza is not Israel. Gaza is Palestinian. Let them run it. However, if they can’t build up a security force that will be effective, then for a period of time until it will be built, there has to be another force. And the only other force is an international intervention force from Europe, something that we did in the south of Lebanon in 2006. We did it, and it was very successful. It helped create an environment that prevented Hezbollah from shooting into Israel for more than 17 years.

And I personally think that Israel would be interested in being part of this international force of rebuilding Gaza because we never had any feud with the people of Gaza. They are the victims of the war, which was imposed by their own people. But if we can be of some help in order to resurrect and rehabilitate Gaza, we should also be part of it.

I proposed to the Palestinian Authority in 2008 a comprehensive agreement on the basis of the [19]67 borders, where Israel will be allowed as part of the agreement anything between 4.4 and 5 percent of the territory of the West Bank. But Israel will agree to swap territories that were part of the state of Israel prior to ’67 to the Palestinian state so that, territorial-wise, the size of the Palestinian state will be equal to ’67.

I propose that all the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem will be part of a Palestinian state that will be the capital of the Palestinian state. I propose that the Holy Basin, the Old City of Jerusalem, will have no sovereignty of any country, not Israeli and not Palestinian, and that it will be administered by trusteeship of five nations: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and America under U.N. Security Council authorization. And that the issue of the Arab refugees will be resolved within the framework of the Arab League peace initiative.

AS: Is there any concern about declining U.S. public support for Israel and that affecting Israel’s military or even diplomatic actions?

EO: I wrote an article in Haaretz where I say that Bibi [Netanyahu] is determined to destroy the relations between Israel and America because he believes that it can somehow strengthen his status with his political base. “All the world is against us, and Bibi’s the only guy who has the guts and the power and the determination to face the whole world,” which he thinks may help him with his supporters.

This is not between America and Israel. This is between Bibi and the rest of the world. The relationship between Israel and America is great. And we don’t have any reason to complain about [U.S. President Joe] Biden. I mean, what he has been doing to me is admirable. Netanyahu thinks that he can fool the world, and the reason that the American reaction is not tougher and harsher and more aggressive is because of the deep commitment of President Biden to the state of Israel, to the people of Israel. But there will be a point where [tensions] may erupt and Israel may be forced to pay a price that will be very costly.

AS: There are U.S. efforts to restart normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Are we likely to see a turn to friendlier Israeli-Arab nation relations in the near future?

EO: We have peace agreements with four Arab countries. Now, the whole strategy of President Biden, which I entirely agree with, to change the balance in the Middle East is to create a new axis of all the moderate Arab countries, and that includes Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Israel and a Palestinian state. So that will create a certain new bloc of countries that are cooperating together.

Now, the crown prince in Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, is very much in favor of this. But they can’t move forward to do it unless there is some kind of movement on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, because [Riyadh is] concerned that without some kind of a rapprochement between us and the Palestinians, that public opinion in those countries—even though they are not precisely democracies—the public opinion of the Muslims in those countries can erupt in opposition in a way that they don’t want to have to deal with.

AS: If you were in Netanyahu’s shoes right now, what would you do differently?

EO: Look, Netanyahu is a failure. [U.S. commentator] Tom Friedman said that he’s the worst leader the Jewish people ever had in the history of the Jewish people. We have a long history, so you have to be exceptional to be the worst.

There was a very interesting and a very, very powerful relatively short article on [Saturday] in the Hebrew edition of Haaretz by a well-known writer in Israel who used to be a very intimate friend of Netanyahu’s. He repeats what Friedman says: [Netanyahu] will not stop before he destroys the state of Israel. He doesn’t care for the people of Israel. He despises them because they don’t understand his greatness and because they don’t understand that only he can guide them and can lead them.

Look, I think that Netanyahu’s really a shallow person. That’s what I thought about him from the day that we met. I never changed my mind. We were in the same party. We were in the same cabinet for a while, and then I replaced him with a minister of finance. But I never had any personal relations other than the formal relations that were part of being in the same government, in the same party. I never trusted him. And I think I was right.