The U.S.-Saudi Agreement Is a Fool’s Errand

The Biden administration is on the cusp of entering an ill-advised bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia. The deal would undermine larger U.S. strategic aims for the Middle East and global order. It could also pose dangerous political risks for President Joe Biden.

Washington and Riyadh are reportedly close to finalizing a pact that would see the United States provide security guarantees for Saudi Arabia and assist in the development of its civilian nuclear program. Supporters of the arrangement maintain that it will enhance regional security by bolstering the U.S.-led alliance in the Middle East against Iran, checking the rising influence of China in the Arab world, and facilitating the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Yet those alleged benefits are either overstated or patently false.

Meanwhile, the potential harms of a Saudi-U.S. deal—which include revived Saudi military adventurism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf, hits to Washington’s global credibility, and further divisions within the Democratic Party ahead of the U.S. presidential election—outweigh any possible benefits for either the Biden administration or international security.

Proponents of the prospective enhanced security agreement argue that it is necessary to deter Iranian aggression. The extent of the security arrangement remains under negotiation, though U.S. officials have indicated that it would likely include formal U.S. defense guarantees and access to more advanced U.S. weapons for Saudi Arabia, potentially including F-35 fighter jets. Reporting suggests that the deal would fall short of a NATO-style pact, however.

Regardless of its specifics, a new Saudi-U.S. security deal is of dubious geopolitical value to the United States. Saudi Arabia has—and continues—to benefit from many decades of U.S. arms sales as well as military and diplomatic assistance. The United States has more than $100 billion in active foreign military sales to the kingdom, according to the State Department. Existing U.S. support for Saudi Arabia places significant constraints on Iranian actions; Tehran knows that if it were to engage in open warfare with Riyadh, it would likely face a regime-threatening response from Washington. Simply put: The deterrent already exists.

What a new U.S. security agreement would do, however, is reward the reckless behavior of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler. Mohammed bin Salman has flouted international norms and destabilized the Middle East with (among other actions) his disastrous military intervention in Yemen, temporary detention of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, blockade against U.S.-allied Qatar, and murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Unprecedented U.S. support could further encourage Mohammed bin Salman’s predilection for reckless military adventurism. After years of escalating tensions between his country and Iran, fueled in part large by their support for opposing factions in the Yemeni civil war, the Saudi government negotiated a cease-fire with the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen in 2022 and normalized relations with Tehran a year later. Although the frosty détente between the two countries has thus far persisted, Riyadh remains concerned about the military activities of Iran and its allies. A new Saudi-U.S. pact might embolden the crown prince to again attack Iranian allies using U.S. weapons.

A new Saudi-U.S. pact would also increase the chance that U.S. forces are drawn into the region’s violence—especially if Riyadh and Washington have signed a defense pact.

Advocates of a new Saudi-U.S. deal additionally argue that the combination of strengthened security ties and U.S. assistance for developing civilian nuclear power in Saudi Arabia would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The former carrot, they say, would assuage the Saudi government’s security concerns and thus its sense of need for nuclear arms; the latter would place Saudi nuclear facilities under U.S. oversight.

Yet such steps would undoubtedly raise Iran’s threat perception, thereby increasing its own incentives to develop a nuclear weapon as a deterrent. And once in possession of nuclear power, it is far more likely that Riyadh could develop a nuclear weapon of its own if it were determined to do so. Saudi-U.S. plans thus increase the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Persian Gulf by stoking Iranian fears and providing Saudi Arabia with key components for nuclear weapons.

Proponents of a Saudi-U.S. agreement also maintain that it will check the rising influence of China in Saudi Arabia—and the wider Arab world. There may be a modicum of truth to this proposition: U.S. officials have indicated that a deal would include Saudi pledges to freeze purchases of Chinese weapons and limit Chinese investments in the kingdom.

Such an agreement would not, however, change the fact that, for years now, China has been both the largest export and import partner of Saudi Arabia. It would also not prevent the Saudi royals from diplomatically engaging with Beijing as they see fit to pursue Saudi national interests. And while additional defense agreements may extend Washington’s influence in Saudi Arabia, they would also reinforce the prevailing order, where the United States is on the hook for the steep costs of maintaining the faltering security of the Persian Gulf while China operates as a free rider.

A Saudi-U.S. deal has likewise been presented as part of a potential grand bargain with Israel, wherein the United States extends defense and nuclear assistance to Riyadh in exchange for the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. This would advance long-standing U.S. aims of Arab-Israeli détente and bolster the region’s anti-Iranian alliance.

Yet there is no urgent need to formalize Israeli-Saudi relations. A de facto peace and anti-Iran alliance between the two countries has now lasted for years—and persisted in the face of Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. In the near term, Israeli-Saudi normalization appears increasingly remote, as the Israeli government evinces little interest in pursuing a two-state solution with the Palestinians, while Riyadh has upheld the need for Israeli support for a Palestinian state as a component for any Saudi recognition of Israel.

Ignored by proponents of a Saudi-U.S. agreement is the notion that U.S. support for the Saudi dictatorship undercuts Washington’s ability to marshal international support for vital causes such as the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression.

Mohammed bin Salman has behaved as a mini version of Russian President Vladimir Putin. In Yemen, the Saudi crown prince militarily invaded his neighbor and subjected civilians to years of fatal bombings and famine; farther abroad, he has assassinated or forced the disappearance of ideological opponents; at home, he has repressed the civil rights of Saudi citizens and conducted mass executions of political prisoners.

Yet the United States offers to lavish the Saudi monarchy with advanced arms and technology. Many people around the world, particularly in the global south, are reticent to join the United States in just causes such as aiding Ukraine because of the unevenness of U.S. support for self-determination and human rights in the Middle East.

Finally, a Saudi-U.S. deal would assist former U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign to return to the White House in what is expected to be a tight race against Biden this fall. Biden and his allies have, with justification, argued that Trump threatens the U.S.-led liberal world order; Trump, for example, suggested in February that he may not come to the defense of some NATO members if they do not up their dues to the alliance.

To block that threat, Biden needs to win reelection. But backing Riyadh is a loser in U.S. politics; for more than two decades, a majority of Americans have held an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia, according to polling, and roughly 3 in 5 Americans oppose committing U.S. soldiers to defending Saudi Arabia in exchange for a normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. Biden would receive few impactful accolades for a Saudi-U.S. deal, but he could face significant opposition from Americans who are hostile toward Saudi Arabia for reasons ranging from the Yemen War and oil prices to human rights and allegations surrounding the 9/11 terror attacks.

If Senate approval is required for a Saudi-U.S. agreement, divisions among Democrats would be further deepened and publicly displayed. When he ran in the Democratic primary for the presidential nomination in 2019, Biden publicly declared that he would make Saudi Arabia a “pariah,” knowing this pledge would be popular with voters. Many Democrats have been dismayed by Biden’s subsequent rapprochement with the kingdom, and it is highly likely that some Democratic senators would oppose a defense and nuclear agreement with Riyadh. Republicans would also have an opportunity to embarrass Biden, as a successful vote is not guaranteed; a failed attempt to pass the deal would contribute to the Republican Party’s narrative that Biden is an ineffective leader.

If the agreement passes—and rewards the authoritarianism and militarism of the Saudi monarchy—it would be an additional obstacle for Biden in his efforts to secure the support of important Democratic voting blocs, including Arab, Muslim, left-leaning, and younger Americans, especially if the deal appears to benefit Israel at the expense of Palestinians. In a close contest, every vote—and campaign donation—matters.

For the sake of the international order that it seeks to uphold, the Biden administration should abandon the fool’s errand of a new Saudi-U.S. bilateral agreement.