Raisi’s Funeral Has Exposed the Two Irans

The helicopter crash that claimed the lives of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and six others has introduced a new crisis for Iran amid regional turmoil and continued severe U.S. sanctions. This event raises questions about the Islamic Republic’s ability to navigate the transition of its presidency at a time of widespread public discontent and a struggling economy.

The reaction to Raisi’s death within Iran has been deeply polarized, reflecting the country’s divisions across social and political ideologies as well as levels of religiosity. Many Iranians do not mourn his passing, viewing him as a symbol of repression due to his long tenure in the judiciary, his involvement in the mass executions of the Mujahedin-e Khalq and leftist political prisoners in 1988, and his harsh crackdown on the “Women, Life, Freedom” demonstrations in 2022. Conversely, there are many who genuinely grieve his death, and the funeral processions have seen massive crowds in Tabriz, Qom, Tehran, and Mashhad.

Government supporters and conservative newspapers have been quick to interpret the large crowds at Raisi’s funeral processions as a testament to the political system’s legitimacy and popular support. One conservative analyst emphasized, in this regard, that “[p]articipation in marches; ceremonies honoring the esteemed martyrs of the system; and political, religious, and social events such as Friday prayers has always been considered one of the prominent indicators of the revolutionaries and the devout people of the country.”

Similarly, the conservative Kayhan newspaper, whose editor is appointed by the supreme leader, asserted, “The people also showed today that revolutionary idealism has not been eradicated from society’s frame since the 1980s. The martyrs and witnesses of the 1980s continue, and the revolutionary ideology has not suffered social decay. The hypothesis of the dissenters was disproven once again.”

However, while the public sphere is tightly controlled by the government, only allowing open and free demonstrations in its favor, a different reality exists in private. Many Iranians, who have endured decades of government repression, welcomed Raisi’s death.

Many recalled the mourning mothers waiting to hear the execution verdicts of their children, or the executions themselves in the 1980s and Raisi’s role in them, and the bodies of loved ones that were never returned to their families after those executions. Hamed Esmaeilion, who lost his wife and daughter when the Iranian military shot down Ukrainian airliner 752 over Tehran in 2020 and is now a Canada-based political activist, echoed this sentiment in a post on X, saying, “It was deserved for Ebrahim Raisi and other criminals of the Islamic government to be tried in a fair court for committing crimes against humanity.”

Meanwhile, Mohammad Zakaei, a professor at the Qom Seminary, explained these reactions by saying, “If we look closely, we realize that people’s joy is not from the death of a person; their joy comes from the death of an ideology and a radical thought, which manifests itself as joy over the death of a symbol of that ideology.”

The opposing sentiments of these groups—both the mourning crowds and the indifferent or even celebratory population—must be taken into account to understand contemporary Iran. The latter group represents a widespread form of passive protest. If this segment of society continues to be ignored and repressed, it is likely that collective protests, similar to the ones that broke out in November 2019 and 2022-23, will break out again.

But the extensive funeral processions largely reflect the segment of society that still aligns with many of the Islamic Republic’s values and ideology. Ignoring or denying this support would be a mistake. Despite Raisi being elected in what was the lowest-turnout presidential election in Iran’s history, his death indicates that the conservative faction can still mobilize significant public support. This is crucial when assessing the Islamic Republic’s resilience and the potential for a successful mass uprising against the state.

Raisi’s death and the upcoming elections will certainly test the system’s adaptability. But the Islamic Republic’s ability to withstand such crises is bolstered by its deep institutionalization. Since 1979, the state has prioritized governance structure over individual leadership, as evidenced by its historical ability to replace leaders and maintain continuity.

Following Raisi’s death, the system is adhering to its constitutional framework to appoint his replacement. There is precedent for early presidential elections, as seen after the dismissal of President Abolhassan Banisadr in June 1981 and the assassination of President Mohammad Ali Rajai in August 1981. The Islamic Republic managed these transitions amid revolutionary chaos and the onset of the Iran-Iraq War.

Samuel Huntington, in his book Political Order in Changing Societies, argues that a key criterion of institutionalization is whether an organization can maintain its structure and function despite the change or death of individuals. The Islamic Republic thus far has exemplified this principle through its ability to sustain governance amid significant leadership changes in the political, scientific, and military realms.

By prioritizing “how to govern” over “who governs,” Iran has created a system where the institutional framework and collective leadership ensure continuity and resilience. This is achieved through a constitutional framework with clear guidelines for leadership succession; institutional bodies such as the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, and the Expediency Discernment Council, which mediate conflicts; and a shared ideological foundation based on heterodox Shiite Islamist principles that unifies the ruling elite.

The role of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, admittedly presents a complex fit within this institutionalist framework. Although Khamenei has been in power for more than three decades and benefits from an authority bolstered his 1979 revolutionary credentials, his position is also institutionalized within the political system of the Islamic Republic. The constitution, while providing broad and somewhat ambiguous guidelines for the supreme leader’s duties, embeds his role within a larger framework of governance that seeks to ensures continuity beyond individual leadership. The longevity and centralization of Khamenei’s rule suggest a blend of institutional and personal power, through which his role has become deeply ingrained in the political fabric of the Islamic Republic but not entirely separable from his individual influence and charisma.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) presents a similarly complex example of institutionalism. Originally established to protect the revolution’s ideals, the IRGC has seen its influence expand significantly, now playing a critical role in Iran’s political, economic, and military spheres. This expansion of power includes control over substantial economic enterprises and a decisive role in domestic and foreign policy. The IRGC’s influence, therefore, represents a parallel power structure within the state, one that can sometimes operate independently of traditional institutional constraints.

The key question now is whether the system can maintain its stability after the eventual death of Khamenei. Raisi’s rise in Iranian politics and his uncontested “victory” in the 2021 presidential election reflected efforts by Khamenei—and his loyal factions—to ensure maximum control over the succession process.

Raisi, viewed as a compliant figure, managed to stay in Khamenei’s good graces—unlike previous presidents. It is likely that the same rationale that led to Raisi’s presidency will influence the upcoming presidential election. Khamenei and the hard-liners will likely be reluctant to allow prominent moderates and reformists to run, as this could diminish their control over Khamenei’s succession process.

This transition, when it occurs, will be the ultimate test of the resilience of the Islamic Republic’s institutional framework.