Does Trump Have a Foreign-Policy Vision?

Last weekend, in back-to-back votes in Congress, House representatives finally approved $95 billion in foreign aid for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. As it happened, a majority of Republicans voted against aid to Ukraine, but it wasn’t enough to prevent the first major tranche of assistance to Kyiv since 2022, when the Republican Party won back control of the House. The vote may yet cost Speaker Mike Johnson his job.

All of this raises a recurring question: Is there a cohesive Republican foreign policy today? Has former President Donald Trump co-opted the entire party apparatus?

In a new book, We Win, They Lose: Republican Foreign Policy and the New Cold War, authors Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea argue that while it may seem Republicans are split on America’s role in the world, they are in fact “remarkably united” on core pillars of foreign policy and defense. I spoke with Kroenig, a columnist at this magazine, about his book on FP Live. We discussed the authors’ premise of a “Trump-Reagan fusion” on foreign policy and what a Trump 2.0 White House could look like. Subscribers can watch the full interview on the video box atop this page or listen to an audio version on the FP Live podcast. What follows is a condensed and edited transcript.

Ravi Agrawal: To most observers, when it comes to foreign policy, the Republican Party seems to be in disarray. You say otherwise. So what exactly is a Republican foreign policy?

Matthew Kroenig: There’s a lot of focus on the divisions within the party because of the divisions over Ukraine. But as my coauthor and I argue in this book, we think that there is actually a lot of unity in the party when you take a step back. We call this new synthesis the “Trump-Reagan fusion,” which takes some of the traditional principles of Reaganism and updates them for the 21st century with some of Trump’s ideas.

Essentially, we argue that in political philosophy, conservatives and progressives have different views about the nature of the international system and the proper role of the U.S. government. And we argue that both Reaganites and Trumpians are conservative in defense policy and believe in peace through strength. The idea that the U.S. government should be so strong that adversaries don’t challenge us, but that the purpose is peace. They’re skeptical of military intervention.

Economic policy is free and fair trade. Reagan and Trump were more alike when it comes to economic policy than many people may realize. And then in terms of values, they believe in American exceptionalism, which is different from how the left views the United States.

And then if you go through every major issue, they agree that China is the greatest threat facing the country, that NATO allies need to do more to defend Europe, that the Iran nuclear deal was a mistake, and that we need to be tougher against Iran. They agree that the climate threat is exaggerated and border security is a problem. So again, looking more broadly, I think there is a lot of unity in Republican foreign policy today.

RA: Critics of this Reagan-Trump fusion might ask if this view isn’t just an attempt to explain Trumpism, to try to frame into a logic what often seems unpredictable and chaotic, and to create a party policy out of something that is just about what benefits one man.

MK: That is partly why we wanted to write this book about what Trumpism is—and what are the through lines in the foreign policy. You do have some isolationists who are saying that Trumpism is essentially isolationism and protectionism. And I don’t think that’s the case. You can criticize how he governed in his first term, but I don’t think it’s fair to say it was isolationist. The United States remained engaged in varying ways, in major theaters like Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. My coauthor and I wanted to try to capture what we think really was the through line in Trumpism and point out that in some ways it’s more consistent with Reaganism than many people may appreciate and may be a return to some of the party’s traditions that [former President] George W. Bush and other Republicans strayed from in the early part of this century.

RA: On the isolationist point, Trump has often suggested strongly that he could pull out of NATO. More importantly, during his term, he did pull out of the Paris climate accords. He did pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He did pull out of the Iran nuclear deal—against the wishes of every other U.N. Security Council member. And when you add all of that up, “America First” begins to sound like “America Alone,” with Trump at the vanguard of a movement that genuinely seems to believe that America should stay out of world affairs. Isn’t it fair to interpret that as isolationism?

MK: I don’t think so. Let me take it in pieces.

So first, conservatives in the United States thought that several of those deals didn’t advance American interests. Remember, there was bipartisan opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. Every Republican in Congress and some Democrats opposed it. Every single Republican candidate in 2016 was opposed to the deal and said they were going to rip it up. Trump was the relative moderate of that group who said he wanted to try to renegotiate it, and he did try to renegotiate it for the first year.

And then if you look at alliances, I think often people think of alliances only in terms of Europe. But if you look at the Middle East, the Trump administration brought about the Abraham Accords and expanded on the Quad initiative, strengthening partnerships and alliances in the Indo-Pacific. And then even if you look at Europe, the rhetoric was often tough against the European allies, but the actual actions of the Trump administration increased spending for NATO, brought in two new members to the alliance during the Trump administration, killed a bunch of Russian mercenaries on the ground in Syria, and provided lethal aid to the Ukrainians. I think if you look at the outcomes of the policies, the Trump administration did strengthen U.S. alliances in key regions.

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RA: One of the immediate criticisms of a Trump-Reagan fusion is that there is more that differentiates them than unites them. So, for example, Reagan would never say the things Trump has said about NATO. And then there’s trade; Reagan only occasionally relied on tariffs. Trump, however, has gone further on that across the board and has threatened the kinds of tariffs that would make it harder for a traditional Reaganite to call it a free-market administration.

MK: You’re absolutely right that Trump and Reagan are also different. Many people have pointed that out in terms of style and in terms of character. What we’re trying to point out in the book is that when it comes to policies, they are more similar than many people may appreciate.

Let’s take trade as an example. People think of Reagan as a free trader or Trump as a protectionist. But if you go back to Reagan, he did use tariffs against Japan, against the European common market, against other U.S. friends and allies. And he said the point of this was to bring about free and fair trade. Similarly for Trump, he’s not protectionist for its own sake. Trump has been clear that the purpose is to bring about fair and reciprocal trade. He updated trade agreements with Mexico and Canada, with South Korea, and tried to get a trade agreement with China. And I think we also have to remember Trump’s negotiating style. I think that’s an opening negotiating position, the invitation to discuss a trade agreement that would be fair and reciprocal in his view

RA: Speaking of maximalist opening positions, the title of your book is We Win, They Lose. That strikes me as zero-sum. And this, of course, was Reagan’s famous line about his goal from competition with the Soviet Union. But today, China is a far bigger economy, and crucially, it is far more integrated into every country’s economy. If China loses, doesn’t the world lose?

MK: I’ve asked senior U.S. officials what we are trying to achieve in the current competition with China, and I haven’t really gotten a clear answer. Some have said, well, avoid war. I think that’s not right. Some said, well, we’re just going to have to do this forever. I think that’s not quite right, either. Carthage and Rome aren’t still competing. This is going to come to an end one way or another.

And so we think the answer is “we win, they lose.” We define that as getting to a place where China no longer has the ability or the will to threaten America’s vital interests. It doesn’t mean China as a country has to lose. It just means that the current aggressive strategy of [Chinese President] Xi Jinping has to lose.

RA: But if losing means that China can’t act from a position of strength, that means severe economic decline at the very least. If you speak to the vast majority of countries in Asia, in Africa, they all have problems with China, but they don’t necessarily want to see China lose, even in the way that you’re describing. They need a vibrant, growing China to help their own economies.

MK: I think the country that’s done the most to constrain China so far is China. Xi’s economic policies over the past several years and his aggressive foreign policy have undercut China’s successful growth model.

But then, what we advocate for in the book, for the United States, but also for allies and partners and countries in the global south, is de-risking. It’s not to say that you need to cut off trade with China altogether, but in sensitive national security areas, it’s not in their interest to have China control the digital infrastructure of the 21st century, not in their interest to allow China to put in place infrastructure that could be used for military or intelligence purposes.

RA: In an excerpt of your book in Foreign Policy, you describe the conservative viewpoint as one that sees the duty of the government as being able to “secure American interests in a dangerous world.” And, by contrast, you say that “progressives tend to prioritize cooperation with other nations to address shared global challenges.” Isn’t the last few years of geopolitics basically showing that the main thing Washington has going for it is alliances, and the main thing it tends to be vilified for is its desire to secure its interests? 

MK: Essentially, the difference is that conservatives think the world is dangerous and that the job of the government is to look after its own people. Progressives are more informed by the European Enlightenment idea that past conflict and problems were the result of ignorance and that if we cooperate and apply science and reason, we can make the world a better place. Those are differences that inform big debates over international institutions, use of force, etc.

The conservative worldview is that cooperating with other nations is not a goal in and of itself, that sometimes cooperating with other nations can help the United States to secure its interests. We advocate in the book for an enlightened self-interest that often what’s good for the United States, a democratic superpower, is also good for the rest of the free world. And that certainly it would be better than if China or Russia dominated the international system.

RA: Progressives see big global problems as requiring global cooperation to solve, whether with the pandemic or climate change, which, of course, progressives see as an existential threat. And conservatives tend to want to downplay that. If you see the climate crisis as an existential threat, then doesn’t that challenge some of the principles of not kind of centering cooperation first?

MK: Conservatives would say that, yes, if you want to bring down greenhouse gas emissions or have an effective global response to things like pandemics, then that will require global cooperation. But they disagree with progressives and say, “OK, we have to be realistic. Who are the partners we’re talking about cooperating with here?”

And the answer is China and the Chinese Communist Party. If we want to solve climate change, they’re the biggest greenhouse gas emitter. They’re promising to increase their greenhouse gas emissions over the coming years. While the United States and Europe are already cutting their emissions. If you think about pandemics, of course, COVID-19 started in China. And in both of these places, China is essentially a bad actor. If it had reported it earlier, we maybe could have prevented COVID-19 from becoming a pandemic. Still, to this day, they refuse to allow an effective investigation. And then again, on climate change, they continue to increase their emissions. And so essentially saying we’re going to cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party to solve these shared challenges is like saying we’re going to cooperate with arsonists to stop fires.

RA: Many people in the global south will say that they didn’t cause the buildup of carbon emissions that the world is confronted with today and they lack the means to deal with them. But let’s leave that debate for now.

What would a Trump 2.0 foreign policy look like?

MK: Well, I think the place to start to look would be the first Trump administration. My assessment of the first administration is that there was a lot of chaos in terms of the tweets and the conflicting messaging. But then if you look at the underlying policy and the results, I thought that it was pretty consistent with how conservatives have managed international affairs in the past. And looking at the results, there was peace in Europe, peace in the Middle East, and the global economy was doing well. That’s different from where we are now with a major war in Europe and in the Middle East. So, I guess I would expect a similar thing from a Trump 2 administration: probably a lot of chaos, a lot of tweets, confusing statements, maybe hiring and firing people by tweet. But I suspect the underlying principles, as we argue in the book, are still there and that despite the chaos, the policy would be stable and lead to good outcomes. That would be my expectation and my hope.

RA: What worries you about Trump 2.0?

MK: Well, they are going to come into a dangerous world if they win, with an ongoing war in Europe, an ongoing war in the Middle East, and China threatening to invade Taiwan. In many ways, I think this is the most dangerous international security environment the United States and its allies have had to deal with since the end of the Cold War.

As a second thing, if it were up to me, I think getting the NATO allies to do more makes sense. I’d probably go about it in a different way. Sometimes the communication style does worry allies and within the United States. There would be a lot of confusion over whether a tweet really was policy or was just a tweet.

So this gets to another worry: How does the rest of the world react to a Trump 2 administration? I think that does matter. We did see some allies in the first Trump administration who thought, we’re going to work pragmatically with this team. That’s a key variable as well; does the rest of the world say, “OK, this is the will of the American people, so let’s have a constructive relationship,” or are they resisting in ways that are counterproductive?

RA: And within the broader right-wing ecosystem, do you worry about this fascination-slash-sympathy for leaders like [Russian President Vladimir] Putin, or [Prime Minister Viktor] Orban in Hungary?

MK: Personally, I don’t see that as much. If you look at the first term, Trump had a pretty tough policy on Putin. If you look at some of Trump’s recent statements, he said he’d park a nuclear submarine outside of Russia, that he’d give [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky more than he’s ever got.

And I do think, though, that one of America’s greatest strengths is its values. What’s the incentive for America’s democratic allies to side with us over China? Our shared values.

I’m not sure that that’s exactly how Trump sees it. He is more of a realist. But if you look at the people who served in the first Trump term—Mike Pompeo, Nikki Haley—and the people who would likely serve in a second term, I do think that broadly, the Republican Party understands this American exceptionalism, that American values are superior to the values of China and Russia.

RA: Former Trump administration officials like John Bolton have said they will never work for Trump again. So were Trump to get reelected, who would his key foreign-policy advisors be?

MK: Trump himself hasn’t said anything publicly, so we don’t know. But there are some possibilities. Pompeo served as secretary of state and CIA director in the first term; he said he’d be honored to serve again. Richard Grenell, who was ambassador to Germany in the first term, is rumored to be also on the shortlist for a Trump 2 administration. Sen. [Bill] Hagerty, former ambassador to Japan, is mentioned as a possible secretary of state. [Sen.] Tom Cotton has been mentioned as a secretary of defense. So I do think that there are a lot of qualified people who would want to serve and who are in Trump’s good graces.

RA: There is a growing sense among that community globally that they might need to prepare for a Trump 2.0 White House. Especially in Europe, for example, there’s talk of Trump-proofing foreign policy. You’re arguing that they don’t need to Trump-proof, because what you’re hearing—Trump’s rhetoric—isn’t necessarily what Trump would do. Have you had much luck in explaining that to your interlocutors when you travel around the world?

MK: You’re right that some are worried. But some of them say, “We’re an important ally and we know that the United States understands why it needs to work with us. We were able to deal with Trump in the first term. We’ll be able to deal with him in a second term.” And I think in some parts of the world, like in the Middle East, there’s maybe a sense that the relationship would improve in the Trump administration from where it is with the Biden administration.

But there is worry, especially in European capitals. My message would be that maybe they’re worrying too much. What I advise European officials is to spend your 2 percent on defense if you’re a NATO member, because it’s the right thing to do, and if Trump’s elected, you can say “we’re not free riders.” And then thirdly, and this is least likely, but if the United States suddenly turns isolationist, then they are in a better position to defend themselves.