Climate
& Security

MENA An Early Warning System for the Climate-Security Threat

Since 2007, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has experienced chronic droughts, which have played a role in exacerbating civil unrest and conflict—a climate-security nexus that has largely gone under-reported. The region, principally reliant on agriculture for food and employment, has seen low crop yields and increasingly parched farmland, which have increased migration to urban areas and triggered widespread food shortages. Rising sea levels are contributing to salination of the soil along the Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers, which are vital sources of freshwater that feed the fertile deltas upon which the agriculture industry and millions of people’s livelihoods depend. The Middle East, including the Gulf states, is the largest wheat and grain importer in the world, meaning that weather phenomena impacting crop yields in other regions can have a substantial and immediate impact in the MENA region. Though not commonly linked in major media nor the geopolitical discourse, the 2011 Arab Spring represents a prime example of the social and political instability that can stem from climate-related disruption. Widespread protests over the price of bread, which had skyrocketed due to climate-related agricultural shocks affecting grain prices in 2010—notably the sustained droughts in Russia, Ukraine, and China, the major staple commodity suppliers to MENA—precipitated the Arab Spring. Torrential rains in Canada, Australia, and Brazil at that time compounded the shock and further rocked global grain markets, thus threatening food security elsewhere.

More than 35% of MENA’s population and 13% of GDP depend on agriculture, making climate-related economic shocks a major threat for the region.

The dynamics in the MENA region and the Nile Basins are not isolated but rather emblematic of this pressing global issue. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has identified the Blue and White Nile River Basins, critical water sources for the twelve countries it traverses, as one of the areas most vulnerable to climate change. The Nile, which sustains 300 million people, is currently managed via the cooperative Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a non-binding intergovernmental framework established in 1999. While it has been successful in improving transnational cooperation and resource-sharing, particularly regarding early flood and drought warnings, the lack of a binding legal framework laying out sharing provisions and enforcement mechanisms is an ongoing challenge for the organization and the region. Governments upstream and downstream are prioritizing domestic access, and conflicts of interest are intensifying as droughts become more frequent and devastating, and other sources of freshwater grow scarcer.

Food Security Threats Intensifying

These compounding climate risks directly affect food security in the Middle East and North Africa, which is highly vulnerable to weather-related shocks that disrupt logistics as well as production. The region relies heavily on waterways including the Black Sea and Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz for access to staple grain exports (largely from Ukraine and Russia), all of which are at risk of closure due to extreme weather events. Chatham House recently described these waterways as key “chokepoints” whose vulnerability to closure could easily create or exacerbate food scarcity and political insecurity in the MENA region. Just over one-third of grain imports to the region pass through a maritime chokepoint, which is the only transportation route. These vulnerabilities are being compounded by longer-term climatic changes. The World Economic Forum (WEF) has predicted that just 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming globally by 2030 could lead to a 40 percent loss in maize crops in sub-Saharan Africa, another key breadbasket for the Middle East, and the UN has predicted a significant loss in agricultural and livestock productivity in the MENA region going forward.

These 4 crops make up 2/3 of human caloric intake, with each degree of warming projected to adversely impact yields.

SOURCE: NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Projected yield declines for each 1 degree of C warming

-7% Corn

-6% Wheat

-3.2% Rice

-3.1% Soy

Impacts on agriculture and food security present direct and growing threats to employment and livelihoods. Agriculture is a major source of employment in the region: in Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, more than half of all employment is linked to farming and livestock rearing. The MENA region’s outsized youth population (ages 15–24), growth rate, and high rate of youth unemployment make it exceptionally vulnerable to civil unrest from a growing number of unemployed and disenfranchised citizens: As of December 2019, youth unemployment in Egypt was at 32.4 percent, and in Sudan it was 27 percent, although Ethiopia was doing relatively well at 2.8 percent, according to data from the World Bank.

The compounding risks are intensifying. The collapse of the agriculture industry due to crop failure or supply chain disruptions in any of these countries would not only lead to food shortages, price spikes, and widespread hunger, it would devastate farmers’ incomes and throw millions of people out of work. Under such circumstances, farmers and agricultural workers will be pressured to migrate to urban centers to seek work, which will exacerbate overcrowding, intensify competition over already scarce jobs, and elevate risks of social and civil unrest.

These issues are not isolated to MENA. Based on current trends, global demand for water is projected to exceed sustainable supply by 40 percent in 2030, while the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that by 2050, 4 billion people could be living in water-scarce areas. In Central America—where 30 percent of employment in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and 13 percent of employment in Mexico, is in agriculture—climate change is predicted to have a significant impact on maize, bean, and coffee production as El Niño weather events become more extreme, and precipitation in the winter months decreases. The World Bank identifies Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia as the three key hotspots for this kind of agricultural degradation.

Politicization & Weaponization of Water by State and Non-State Actors

Water scarcity, in particular, remains a subject of economic and security concerns for national governments and key external stakeholders in the region, with events occurring in MENA foreshadowing the types of water-related conflicts and resource-management challenges that will increasingly apply to, and be instructive for, the rest of the world. Notably, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, started in 2010, has been a focal point and increasing source of tension for the last decade, given its potential to deprive or potentially cut off Egypt from its primary water source: 85 percent of Egypt’s water supply travels through Ethiopia (96 percent beyond Egypt’s borders generally), making the two countries highly interdependent and the stakes of resource negotiation and management exceedingly high. Recent mediation talks between the two countries, hosted by the U.S., failed to reach a consensus on how to fill the dam’s reservoir, which has the potential to hold as much water as Egypt currently absorbs annually. At the same time, the dam promises economic revitalization in Ethiopia—including job creation and the potential to make it the largest electricity exporter in Africa, as it will nearly triple Ethiopia’s current capacity to generate energy. However, restrictions on water use threaten the basic food and water security of countries downstream that have for years relied on outdated and non-binding agreements on water usage. Domestically, the GERD is a symbol of national pride and unity, but it has the potential to become a flashpoint for growing tension and civil unrest due to its long construction delays and ever-growing budget. The dam was initially scheduled to be finished in 2015, and a previous shortfall in funding was met by civil servants donating their salaries, and a widespread fundraising campaign among Ethiopian residents and its large diaspora community.

The Arab region contains 13 of the world’s 17 most water-stressed countries. Climate change in the Arab region threatens to reduce food and water productivity a further 20% by 2030.

Source: World Resources Institute

This is not just a localized issue. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), as of 2020, 60 percent of the world’s transboundary river basins lack a cooperative management framework, making them ripe for future international tension, and potential sites of exploitation by malicious actors. The MENA region is just one among several regions grappling with cross-border tensions over shared water resources. The Indus Waters Treaty, signed by India and Pakistan in 1960, is perhaps the longest-standing water-sharing agreement in the world, and it has remained in place despite India and Pakistan’s long-running cold conflict and regular border disputes, particularly over the status of the Jammu and Kashmir regions, where a number of the subcontinent’s rivers begin. Analysts and diplomats would be remiss to take the treaty for granted and must continue to monitor the situation, with the aim of safeguarding the region’s water sources and managing their use to mitigate future cross-border tensions. The Mekong river in China is another subject of concern, as China’s widespread hydroelectric power program threatens the volume of water the river and its tributaries bring downstream to Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

In addition to exacerbating tensions between national governments, non-state actors are increasingly weaponizing vital water resources to achieve their goals. Most notably among them are the Islamic State (IS) and al-Shabaab. Recent analysis by Dr. Marcus King of the George Washington University and the Center for Climate and Security highlights how in 2014, the capture of the Mosul Dam by IS led directly to U.S. forces becoming more deeply involved in the fight against the terrorist group, and thus in the Syrian conflict. The dam’s strategic position on the Tigris, upstream from the Green Zone in Baghdad, gave IS the ability to threaten the entire U.S. infrastructure in Baghdad, creating a situation in which American forces could only protect themselves by entering further into the fight against the terrorist group. It has also been discovered that IS taxed residents in Raqqa for access to their water sources, enabling the group to fund its administration of its territory and to buy and produce weapons for its ongoing war. More recently, in 2018, al-Shabaab diverted water from the Juba River to disrupt the surveillance of American Green Berets and Kenyan forces in the area. The sudden floodwaters forced the troops to change their route and enabled the insurgents to mount a successful ambush, resulting in the death of one American soldier, and a public-relations victory for the terrorist group. These incidents demonstrate that weaponization of water works. With the resource likely to be increasingly wielded as instrument of war, effective management is crucial to security.

AFP/GETTY IMAGES

6 ways water is becoming a weapon of war

Strategic Weaponization

Using water to destroy important areas, infrastructure, or broad populations

Tactical Weaponization

Using water to destroy, disable, or deny access to military targets in the battlespace

Coercive Weaponization

Providing water to fund territorial administration or to acquire weapons, with the goal of achieving legitimacy

Unintentional Weaponization

Attempting water weaponization, causing collateral damage to the environmentor to the local population

Instrument of Psychological Terrorism

Threatening to withhold or contaminate the water supply to create fear among noncombatants

Instrument of Extortion or Incentivization

Providing water to reward or punish subject populations and to support legitimacy of the perpetrator

SOURCE: MARCUS D. KING, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY’S ELLIOTT SCHOOL AND THE CENTER FOR CLIMATE & SECURITY

Instability and Resource Scarcity Driving Internal Displacement and Migration

In addition to jeopardizing domestic security, climate-related instability and resource scarcity are predicted to be the largest causes of forced migration in the coming decades. The WEF estimates that in 2019, 16.1 million people were displaced due to climate-related factors and predicts that by 2050 that number will jump more than twelve-fold to 200 million people. These migrants will join the 70.8 million refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2019, but they are not currently protected by the same regime of international laws and norms that guide the treatment of people forcibly displaced by persecution and conflict. This will leave “environmental migrants” vulnerable to abuse and mistreatment as desertification, extreme weather conditions, and rising sea levels increasingly disrupt agriculture and create regional instability.

In the MENA region, the effects of climate change have already led to widespread insecurity and conflict. As noted above, crop failure within the region has contributed to growing unrest, as increasing numbers of rural dwellers have moved to urban settlements, exacerbating overcrowding and higher levels of unemployment. In Syria, where civil conflict still rages, agricultural failures between 2006 and 2009 led to around 800,000 people losing their livelihoods and basic food supplies. As early as 2011, the UN was already reporting that one million Syrians, out of a population of 21 million, had been driven into food insecurity, and more than 1.5 million people had moved from rural regions to cities and displacement camps, including to Aleppo, Damascus, Dara’a, and Homs. Dara’a was the site of the some of the earliest protests in Syria’s conflict, when unemployed young men were arrested and tortured for posting anti-Assad graffiti.

Both forced and voluntary migration affect the national politics of home, transit, and host countries. With respect to Syria, for example, UNHCR estimates that 6.6 million Syrians are internally displaced, and a further 5.6 million have fled the country entirely, seeking shelter in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, and crossing the Mediterranean into the European Union. The displacement has enabled the Assad regime to consolidate power at home and has stoked nationalist sentiments in EU border countries, including Greece, Hungary, and Italy. The compounding issues fuel a vicious cycle, with climate-linked insecurities driving further internal displacements, migrant camp overcrowding, risky border and sea crossings, and urban densification.

These pressures are spreading globally. The World Bank predicts that by 2050, without strong action on climate change, 143 million people worldwide may be internally displaced. In Latin America, for example, it is predicted that up to 2.6 percent of the region’s total population may become what the World Bank is terming “internal climate migrants.” Humanitarian concerns and pressure on national resources from the migrant crises continue to mount, underscoring the transnational impact of climate change and its increasing influence on politics. Effective responses to climate change-related instability must recognize the multi-dimensional nature of the risks to more effectively mitigate and manage its impacts.

FP PeaceGames An Innovative Approach to Mitigating and Managing Climate and Security Threats

Identifying effective, multi-stakeholder and cross-border strategies to mitigate these risks is increasingly urgent. It was with these urgent issues in mind and the conviction in the power of simulation and scenario planning that, in November 2019, Foreign Policy along with its partners convened a series of Climate and Security PeaceGames, bringing together global leaders, diplomats, policy planners, and subject-matter experts in Paris and Abu Dhabi, to think through and “game out” responses to these types of cascading events that are being triggered and exacerbated by climate change. The PeaceGames were produced in partnership with the Paris Peace Forum, Körber Stiftung, and the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, with support from the United Arab Emirates. The urgency of the issue was palpable due to the recent spate of record-breaking heatwaves around the world, which caused deaths, hospitalizations, and economic stress and make diplomatic breakthroughs and concrete action ever more urgent.

FP PeaceGames are scenario-based crisis simulations that offer participants a chance to address the challenges of diplomacy and peacebuilding with the same creativity and focus that traditionally have been devoted to war games. With the primary goal of peacefully resolving or avoiding conflicts, these simulations also strengthen communication among stakeholders; enable more strategic and effective planning; and inform policy, investment, and resource-allocation decisions. Participants take on the role of another key stakeholder in the crisis, enabling them to see the issues through another lens, more deeply understand other actors’ incentives, and think creatively about solutions.

Learn More

The Climate & Security PeaceGames were convened not only to prepare for future crises, but also to address sources of instability that are already materializing. In the face of seemingly intractable disagreements and stalled action, these crisis simulations endeavored to chart a path forward. As disasters linked to climate change occur with increasing frequency, exacerbating resource scarcity and instability in many regions of the world, this simulation challenged participants to think through and respond to immediate climate-related crises, and to plan long-term adaptation and mitigation strategies.

Set in 2030 in the Middle East and North Africa, the Climate & Security scenario was developed through in-depth research and consultation with subject-matter experts and incorporated specific events and climate-related crises that are already beginning to unfold. Throughout the PeaceGames, participants responded to cascading climate-related crises triggered by a widespread and long-lasting drought.

Participants assumed the roles of key actors within the region, including governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, which enabled them to assess the crises from a new perspective and to more deeply understand other actors’ incentives and motivations for action. While actors such as the United States, China, and Russia are critical to addressing climate-related problems, the simulation focused on regional actors, given their high degree of influence over security, stability, and migration routes in this scenario. Centering dialogue around these key stakeholders also helped to ensure that the regional actors most affected were given a prominent seat at the table.