Timeline for Can a pilot with an ICAO Multi-Crew Pilot License fly an airliner into the U.S.?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
10 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Dec 16, 2023 at 21:46 | comment | added | Jpe61 | @PeteP. The whole shitshow was designed such that pilot interaction was nonexistent. Unmanageabe, untrainable. Training was not necessary, since it was impossible, as you mentioned. | |
| Dec 16, 2023 at 14:44 | comment | added | Pete P. | @jpe61 Got carried away and forgot to point out that no simulator training was/is possible for MCAS; it has no ON/OFF switch, no handles, knobs or levers by which its operation can be modulated. No warnings, messages or procedures that mention it. Normal operation is not noticeable except as a spinning trim wheel which cannot be discerned from operation of the Speed Trim System. Non-normal operation manifests as a runaway stab trim, the procedure for which is taught for the basic 737 type rating. Sim training for MCAS = teaching a driver to shift gears in an automatic transmission car. | |
| Dec 16, 2023 at 14:29 | comment | added | Pete P. | @jpe61 Avoiding training i.e. designing for natural human behavior/capability is not a bad objective. Training often tries to overcome natural behavior/capacity but when the human brain is sufficiently fatigued or overstressed it tends to revert to a minimal effort mode, perhaps in self-protection. Then pilots recall the most easily recalled muscle memory and perform actions for airplane B while flying airplane A. That reversion point is unpredictable due to the number of factors involved and individual variances in response to each. The same type rating is not to save money but for safety. | |
| Jul 30, 2020 at 20:19 | comment | added | reirab | @PeteP. Yeah, it's especially interesting to compare vs. the U.S. in that same period. On all U.S. air carriers put together (which represent a rather large percentage of all air scheduled air carrier operations worldwide,) there has been exactly 1 passenger death since 2009. And that was due to flying debris from an engine failure. The last passenger fatality due to pilot error was the Colgan crash in 2009 and the last one on a mainline airliner was the A300 crash in Queens in 2001, nearly 19 years ago. | |
| Feb 18, 2020 at 22:15 | comment | added | Jpe61 | I agree. It makes me wonder how planes get more an more complicated, yet at the same time there is a tendency to create licence categories that enable less and less trained people to fly these winged computers. Still, Boeing had a key role in the MAX catastrophy. They tried to avoid having to train pilots! Stupid, stupid, stupid. | |
| Feb 18, 2020 at 20:45 | comment | added | Pete P. | A farce is a farce. The fact that people died and will continue to die if the cause—inadequate training, which is a clear and present danger—is not addressed and eliminated, makes the media’s interference in the investigative process criminal. The ICAO needs to analyze the decade+ worth of real life experience since the MPL was created and evaluate how it serves the flying public in contrast to the FAA’s 1500 hr restriction that was initiated at the same time. | |
| Feb 8, 2020 at 18:51 | comment | added | Jpe61 | Many remarkable thing have come to light during the would be a farce if people had not died MAX cerification process. | |
| Feb 8, 2020 at 14:10 | review | Late answers | |||
| Feb 8, 2020 at 14:58 | |||||
| Feb 8, 2020 at 13:55 | review | First posts | |||
| Feb 8, 2020 at 19:16 | |||||
| Feb 8, 2020 at 13:53 | history | answered | Pete P. | CC BY-SA 4.0 |